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I. INTRODUCTION
A whistleblower has variously been described as a person who voluntary
discloses an activity that they perceive to be “illegal, unethical or
immoral”;1 “a person who believes that truth should prevail over power”
and who, if successful, “brings down corrupt people in high places purely
by exposing information”;2 or a person whose activity “involves ‘the
disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral,
or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons
or organisations that may be able to effect action.’”3
As these definitions indicate, there are many kinds of whistleblower—
internal, external, corporate, public—but none are as controversial as the
person who reveals the wrongdoing of national security forces by leaking
classified material. Such information is, by its very nature, not only sensitive
to its proprietary owners, but to the nation as a whole and all of its citizens,
especially vis-à-vis their relations with other states. This particular type of
whistleblower can therefore be especially interesting to the international
law practitioner; in fact, as this paper explores, such whistleblowers have
gained considerable relevance for international law in recent years.
Leaking military or intelligence information to external media has a
long and varied history, but while earlier defence-industry whistleblowers,
such as Daniel Ellsberg4 and Mordechai Vanunu,5 revealed information
1. Oireachtas Library & Research Service, Disclosure of Information: Duty to
Inform and Whistleblowing, 7 SPOTLIGHT 1, 9 (Dec. 16, 2011).
2. Brian Martin, Illusions of Whistleblower Protection, 5 UTS L. REV. 119, 122
(2003).
3. Paul Latimer & AJ Brown, Whistleblower Laws: International Best Practice,
31 U.N.S.W.L.J. 766, 768 (2008) (quoting Janet Near & Marcia Miceli, Organisational
Dissonance: The Case of Whistleblowing, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 4 (1985).
4. Daniel Ellsberg worked with Anthony Russo, both employees of the partially
government-funded security and defence think tank RAND Corporation, to leak topsecret Pentagon Papers to The New York Times in 1971. See George McGovern & John
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that impacted international relations, they self-identified as being primarily
motivated by concerns over constitutionality and the proper exercise of
democracy within their respective domestic jurisdictions.6 There is,
however, reason to believe that this trend is changing and that recent
military and intelligence whistleblowers place themselves and their
disclosures in a broader global context. While contemporary whistleblowers,
such as Chelsea Manning,7 Katharine Gun,8 and Anat Kamm,9 acknowledge
motivations similar to those expressed by Ellsberg and Vanunu, they
also articulate a desire to expose violations of international law in order

P. Roche, The Pentagon Papers – A Discussion, 87 POL. SCI. Q. 173 (1972); see also
George McT. Kahin, The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation, 69 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 675 (1975) (detailing the contents of the papers); THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN
AMERICA: DANIEL ELLSBERG AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS (Judith Ehrlich & Rick
Goldsmith 2009) (detailing Ellsberg and Russo’s involvement).
5. Mordechai Vanunu, a former employee at the Negev Nuclear Research
Center, sold a series of photos that revealed Israel’s secret nuclear weapons programme
to British newspapers in 1986. See Avigdor Feldman, National Security Secrecy and
Mass Destruction Weapons, 9 COMM. LAW 10, 10–13 (1991); Yerech Gover & Ella
Shohat, In Defence of Mordechai Vanunu: Nuclear Threat in the Middle East, 18 SOC.
TEXT 95 (Winter 1987–1988) (detailing Vanunu’s case).
6. Ellsberg maintained that he had not broken US law, but also eventually stated
that his actions were, in any event, justified by necessity, as officials were acting behind
a “cloak of secrecy” which “tempted them to ignore the constraints of international or
domestic law or the Constitution.” See Ellsberg Affidavit at 9, Florida v. Doe, Nos. 87
363-MM-A and 87-365-MM-A (Fla. Brevard County Ct. May 20, 1987). Vanunu argued
that if Israel “was producing nuclear arms, then concealing this fact from the citizens of
the State imposes on them a moral and legal burden which no government has the right
to impose on her residents without their knowledge and consent.” Feldman, supra note 5,
at 11.
7. Chelsea Manning (formerly known as Bradley Manning), a US Army private,
gave hundreds of thousands of military documents subject to various levels of
classification, now known, inter alia, as the Iraq War Logs, Afghan War Logs, and US
Embassy Cables, to transparency organization Wikileaks for publication in 2010. See
Charlie Savage & Emmarie Huetteman, Manning Sentenced to 35 Years for a Pivotal
Leak of US Files, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013, at A1, A14.
8. Katharine Gun, a translator for British intelligence agency GCHQ, leaked an
e-mail from the NSA (an American intelligence agency) requesting British help in
bugging the communications of UN Security Council members in 2003. See Oliver
Burkeman & Richard Norton-Taylor, The Spy Who Wouldn’t Keep a Secret, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 25, 2004, at G2.
9. Anat Kamm, a former conscript in the Israeli army, leaked hundreds of
military documents pertaining to Israel’s policy of targeted killing to journalist Uri Blau
in 2008. Daniella Peled, The Real Moral of the Anat Kam Story, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8,
2010, 7:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/apr/08/anat-kamm
shin-bet-israel.
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to prevent such infractions in the future and to prosecute those responsible
for past transgressions. These guiding motivations are clearly expressed
in statements made by these whistleblowers: Kamm characterized her
disclosure of classified documents relating to the Israeli Defence Forces’
policy of targeted killings as a measure taken to expose “war crimes”;10
Gun stated that she had tried to prevent “an illegal war” when she leaked
the news that the United States and United Kingdom were spying on their
fellow UN Security Council members in the run-up to the Second Iraq
War;11 Manning regarded the embassy cables she passed on to transparency
organization Wikileaks as exposing “crazy, almost criminal” activity;12 and
Edward Snowden has claimed that the US surveillance programmes PRISM
and XKeyscore that he revealed to the public infringe, inter alia, on Article
12 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.13
These “new” whistleblowers thus, to some extent, perceive themselves
as agents for enforcing international law and the question inevitably arises
as to whether this self-perception can be justified. Is releasing classified
information to the public an effective way to enforce international law? One
that is potentially more effective than sharing that information via
conventional, non-public whistleblowing legislation? And, if so, what are
the implications for both international and national legal systems?
Part II of this article examines the impact that external whistleblowing
can have on a state’s compliance with international law. Part III looks at
some of the complications that disclosing international law violations raises
for the broader legal system, in particular, the expertise that a whistleblower

10. Vered Luvitch, Kam: History Forgives Those Who Expose War Crimes,
YNETNEWS (Apr. 12, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L
3874912,00.html.
11. Ex-GCHQ Officer ‘Preventing War’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2003, 1:57 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3243266.stm.
12. Evan Hansen, Manning-Lamo Chat Logs Revealed, WIRED MAGAZINE (July
13, 2011, 3:40 PM), www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/manning-lamo-logs/.
13. The statement was re-printed in a British newspaper. Edward Snowden
Statement: ‘It was the right thing to do and I have no regrets’, THE GUARDIAN (July 12,
2013, 11:15 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/12/edward-snowden-full
statement-moscow. Article 12 of the UN Declaration reads: “No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks
upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). Snowden could also
have cited Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which reads “(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour
and reputation. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.” G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/6316 (Dec.
19, 1966).
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of this type should be expected to have in the area of international law,
and judicial reactions to defences related to the exposure of international
law violations. Part IV identifies some trends based on this analysis
and what they might mean for external whistleblowing on international
law violations in the future.
I. THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING ON STATE
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Assessing the impact of external whistleblowing on state behaviour is a
complex task. Do states respond when their own violations of international
law are publicly revealed, or do they simply ride out any ensuing
controversy while maintaining their previous conduct? Moreover, is the
public revelation of international law violations more or less effective in
inducing corrective behaviour than following internal whistleblowing
procedures? Recent cases suggest that states are surprisingly responsive to
whistleblowing related to international law infringements and that they
often take action to tighten international law compliance. This is particularly
evident in the cases of Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden.
A. Iraq and Afghan War Logs, Cablegate and “Collateral Murder”
In 2009, Private Chelsea Manning, an American-British citizen deployed
with the American Army to Iraq as a junior intelligence analyst, sent
hundreds of thousands of internal documents subject to varying levels of
security clearance, including the “Collateral Murder” video,14 Iraq and
Afghan war logs, 15 and Cablegate documents, 16 to the transparency

14. Video footage that was taken from the camera of an Apache helicopter gunship
shows the helicopter’s crew shooting and killing approximately a dozen men in Baghdad
in a manner at least partially contrary to the precepts of international humanitarian law.
The video was widely distributed on the internet and is available, inter alia, on Wikileaks. See
wordswithmeaning, Wikileaks Collateral Murder – Full Gun-cam Raw Footage, YOUTUBE
(Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78Pk53Xjvtc. For a discussion of the
legality of the actions depicted, see infra at 280–83.
15. A collection of army field reports filed during the two conflicts. The reports
detail engagements with enemy forces and record, inter alia, the extent of engagement,
numerous civilian deaths in questionable circumstances, and a widespread practice of
handing over detainees to probable torture at the hands of local police. See Savage &
Huetteman, supra note 7.
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organization Wikileaks with the intention that Wikileaks should make
these materials available to the public.17 Many of these documents, or
their contents, were then published not only online by Wikileaks, but also in
print by several major newspapers including The New York Times, Der
Spiegel, and The Guardian. While some of the leaked documents do not
contain any information of relevance for international law,18 there is a
general, if not universal, consensus that the Iraq and Afghan war logs,19
some of the diplomatic cables,20 and the “Collateral Murder” video21 all
reveal evidence of significant, and in some cases systematic, international
law violations committed by state actors.
These disclosures have had a significant international and domestic
effect. Not only have they enabled international organizations to monitor
the specific international law breaches at issue more closely while cogently
and forcefully demanding full compliance with international law,22 they
16. Diplomatic cables sent from US embassies to the United States Government.
In addition to candid opinions on various heads of state, some cables reveal evidence of
probable international law violations.
17. Kevin Poulsen & Kim Zetter, U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in Wikileaks
Video Probe, WIRED (June 6, 2010, 9:31 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/
06/leak/.
18. For example, a 1985 “confidential” cable from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus
merely conveyed then-Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s reaction to developments in
international relations between Libya and Iraq. Asad Congratulates Qadhafi on Rupture
with Iraq, WIKILEAKS (June 27, 1985, 10:29 AM), https://wikileaks.org/cable/1985/
06/85DAMASCUS4001.html.
19. For details and statements, see David Batty & Jamie Doward, Iraq War Logs:
UN Calls on Obama to Investigate Human Rights Abuses, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 23,
2010, 8:41 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/23/united-nations-call
obama-investigation-abuses-iraq.
20. In one cable, Papua New Guinea’s Consul alleges that the Indonesian Armed
Forces are involved in illegal logging and drug smuggling in Papua New Guinea. The
Two Papuas: A Consul General’s View, WIKILEAKS (Oct. 20, 2006, 12:24 PM),
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06JAKARTA12783_a.html. Two other cables,
both labelled “secret,” suggest the complicity of Sri Lankan government officials in
numerous violations of international humanitarian law. See Sri Lanka War Crimes
Accountability: The Tamil Perspective, WIKILEAKS (Jan. 15, 2010, 12:23 PM), http://
wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10COLOMBO32.html; Sri Lanka: GSL Complicit in
Paramilitary Factions’ Human Right Abuses, WIKILEAKS (May 18, 2007, 9:22 AM),
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07COLOMBO728_a.html.
21. See discussion infra at 280–83.
22. UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, has called on the United
States Government to comply with its obligations under the Convention Against Torture,
to investigate the abuses revealed by the war logs, to try all those who are responsible for
torture in Iraq, either directly or through complicity, and to compensate victims. Batty &
Doward, supra note 19. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay,
explicitly referenced the documents disclosed by Wikileaks when urging investigation
and trial of those responsible “in line with obligations under international human rights
law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which both the
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have also prompted internal action within certain states with a view to
either punishing the individuals responsible for infringements or bringing
their conduct back into compliance with international law and avoiding
future violations.
Following the release of the Iraq and Afghan war logs, the Danish
government announced that it will “set up a commission of inquiry to shed
light on . . . potential problems relating to Denmark’s observance of
international conventions in connection with warfare in Iraq and
Afghanistan.”23 Danish authorities also indicated that they may pursue
individuals held to have violated international law in relation to these
conflicts.24 The United Kingdom’s Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg,
has taken a similar position vis-à-vis the international law violations
revealed by Private Manning, stating, “I think anything that suggests that
basic rules of war, conflict and engagement have been broken or that torture
has been in any way condoned are extremely serious and need to be
looked at.”25 These officials—both Danish and British—make the point
that a primary motivation in advocating action is to bring their nations
into compliance with international law and to pursue those responsible
for international law violations.
Shortly after Clegg stated his position, the Iraq Historic Allegations
Team (IHAT) started to investigate allegations of torture committed by
British armed service members and government employees in Iraq.26
Although IHAT had been contemplated since March 201027 (i.e. some
months before the war logs were released), given the time at which it
commenced operations, the leaks may have added some impetus to, and
US and Iraq are parties.” Iraq/Wikileaks: Statement by the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS (Oct. 26, 2010),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10477&Lang
ID=E.
23. Peter Stanners, Iraq Commission to Investigate Danish Involvement in War,
THE COPENHAGEN POST (Apr. 12, 2012, 12:06 PM), http://cphpost.dk/news/iraq
commission-to-investigate-danish-involvement-in-war.1258.html. In particular, Danish
forces are alleged to have handed over prisoners to local authorities despite knowing that
they would likely be tortured. Id.
24. Id.
25. Richard Spencer, Wikileaks: Nick Clegg Backs Call for Investigation, THE
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 24, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
middleeast/iraq/8084116/Wikileaks-Nick-Clegg-backs-calls-for-investigation.html.
26. Ministry of Defence, Iraq Historic Allegations Team Starts Work, GOV.UK (Nov. 1,
2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/iraq-historic-allegations-team-starts-work.
27. See Mousa v Sec’y of State for Def. [2011] EWCA (Civ) 133 (Eng.), ¶ 14.
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certainly added increased public awareness of, its operations. Previously,
investigations of international law breaches committed by British forces
in Iraq had occurred only on a limited basis in the contexts of the alSweady Inquiry, which focused on the particular incident of the Battle of
Danny Boy,28 and the Baha Mousa Inquiry, which focused on the death
of Baha Mousa and “those detained with him” by British forces in Basra,
Iraq. 29 Although the Baha Mousa Inquiry resulted in voluminous
recommendations for general reform (seventy-three in total) within the
British Armed Forces, as far as culpability was concerned, the Inquiry was
naturally limited to the specific incidents that it had been tasked to
investigate,30 circumstances which the British government still viewed as
“extremely rare.”31 Disturbingly, judges complained of being able to convict
only one person for Mousa’s death due to the armed forces’ “closing of
ranks.”32 IHAT plans to reinvestigate Mousa’s death as well as over a
thousand other allegations.33 Thanks in part to Manning’s disclosures, it
is doing so in an atmosphere of heightened public scrutiny.
This, in turn, can help to ensure IHAT’s effectiveness in accurately
assessing the nature and extent of international law violations while
minimizing opportunities for corruption or incompetence to affect
outcomes. British courts have ordered alterations to IHAT practices to
ensure independence, citing, in part, the importance of public perception
and the need for justice to be seen to be done.34
Where courts enjoy independence from executive bodies, domestic
judicial decisions can also provide an extremely powerful method of

28. This inquiry is still ongoing, for more information, see Richard Norton-Taylor, AlSweady Inquiry into Iraq War Abuse Allegations to Hear from Commander, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2014, 10:39 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/06/
al-sweady-inquiry-evidence-commander-andrew-kennett. See also AL-SWEADY PUBLIC
INQUIRY, http://www.alsweadyinquiry.org/index.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
29. See Frequently Asked Questions, THE BAHA MOUSA INQUIRY, http://www.
bahamousainquiry.org/faqs_may09.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
30. SIR WILLIAM GAGE, THE REPORT OF THE BAHA MOUSA INQUIRY (2011),
available at http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/report/index.htm.
31. Liam Fox, Secretary of State for Defence, Statement on the Report into the
Death of Mr. Baha Mousa in Iraq in 2003 (Sept. 8, 2011), available at https://www.
gov.uk/government/speeches/2011-09-08-statement-on-the-report-into-the-death-of-mr-baha
mousa-in-iraq-in-2003.
32. Ben Knight, Abuse in UK’s Iraq Occupation was ‘Systemic’, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.dw.de/abuse-in-uks-iraq-occupation-was-systemic/a
16541688 (quoting Justice Ronald McKinnon).
33. See Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT), GOV.UK (last visited, Mar. 17,
2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/policy-teams/iraq-historic-allegations-team-ihat
34. See Mousa, supra note 27, ¶ 35.
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international law enforcement,35 but they can only operate effectively
where pertinent information and evidence are available to those parties
with grounds to initiate a case. By releasing information to the public,
external whistleblowers ensure that groups and individuals can take
action on a domestic level in those instances where domestic norms give
effect to, or coincide with, the norms of international law. To give one
particularly long-running example: Public Interest Lawyers, which
represents victims of alleged abuse in Iraq, claims that the Iraq war logs
document the extent to which American—and therefore also British—
personnel were aware of the widespread and serious mistreatment of Iraqi
prisoners by British, American, and Iraqi forces.36 Despite their apparent
knowledge of the particularly widespread and severe abuses perpetrated
by Iraqi authorities, Britain had continued to transfer prisoners to Iraqi
custody in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.37 This information,
which had not been available to Public Interest Lawyers or their clients
prior to Wikileaks’ release of the Iraq war logs, 38 has bolstered its
contention that officials and military superiors culpably failed to prevent
abuse in Iraq, and thus enhanced the law firm’s efforts to bring a new
judicial review advocating a full public inquiry “into all breaches of the
duty of non-refoulement by handing over Iraqis to the Iraqi authorities.”39
B. NSA and GCHQ Surveillance Leaks
In 2013, National Security Agency (NSA) analyst Edward Snowden
publicly revealed the existence of the NSA and Government Communication
Headquarters (GCHQ) mass surveillance programmes PRISM, XKeyscore,
and Tempora. The documents leaked by Snowden detail a range of covert
35. For one aspect of international law enforcement through domestic judicial
decisions, see Sandeep Gopalan & Roslyn Fuller, Enforcing International Law: States,
IOs, and Courts as Shaming Reference Groups, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 73 (2014).
36. Mazin Younis, New Legal Challenge over Iraq War Logs: Iraqi Torture Case,
PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERS, http://www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk/news_details.php?
id=13 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. See also Batty & Doward, supra note 19. This has further developed into a
request (submitted by Public Interest Lawyers and the European Centre for Constitutional and
Human Rights) for the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor to investigate British
war crimes in Iraq, although the precise relation between the information contained in
the Iraq war logs and this second action is unclear. Sam Jones, Lawyers Call for
Prosecutions over Iraq Abuse, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 12 2014.
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surveillance activity, including: numerous hacks into the communications
of foreign heads of state, often conducted from US or allied embassies;40
the mass, warrantless surveillance of millions of private citizens;41 and
bugging operations conducted within international organizations and the
premises of foreign representations.42 These actions constitute violations
of Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,43
the sovereignty of the affected states, and, in some cases, the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.44 Despite their obvious illegality,
these breaches were conducted over a lengthy period of time without
becoming subject to internal corrective action. Since the breaches have
become public, this situation has changed dramatically.

40. These actions included hacking the President of Mexico’s e-mail account and
tapping into German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone from the US Embassy in
Berlin. See Jens Glüsing, Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach & Holger Stark, Fresh Leak
on US Spying: NSA Accessed Mexican President’s E-mail, DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 21, 2013;
NSA Überwachung: US-Senat will Handy-Affäre untersuchen [NSA Surveillance: U.S.
Senate will Examine Mobile Affair], SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.spiegel.
de/politik/ausland/nsa-und-merkel-us-senat-plant-untersuchung-der-handy-affaere-a-930524.
html; Der unheimliche Freund [The Uncanny Friend], DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 28, 2013, at 20.
41. The NSA intercepted over 60 million phone calls in the span of just one
month in Spain alone. Spain Launches Legal Inquiry into U.S. Spying Allegations, EURO
WEEKLY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2013, 4:39 PM), http://www.euroweeklynews.com/news/spain/
item/116777-spain-launches-legal-inquiry-into-us-spying-allegations. See also Julian
Borger, GCHQ and European Spy Agencies Worked Together on Mass Surveillance,
THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2013; Philip Bump, The UK Tempora Program Captures Vast
Amounts of Data – and Shares with NSA, THE WIRE (June, 21 2013, 2:22 PM),
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2013/06/uk-tempora-program/66490/; Kadhim
Shubber, A Simple Guide to GCHQ’s Internet Surveillance Programme Tempora,
WIRED.CO.UK (June 24, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-06/24/gchq
tempora-101; Evan MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies & James Ball,
GCHQ Taps Fiber-Optic Cables for Secret Access to World’s Communications, THE
GUARDIAN, June 21, 2013.
42. The NSA bugged the European Union diplomatic representations in Washington
and New York, thereby gaining access to e-mail and internal documents, and tapped the
UN’s internal communication network, thus spying not only on UN officials, but also
country delegations. See Holger Stark, Spähaffäre: Einsames Amerika, SPIEGEL ONLINE
(Oct. 28, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/kommentar-nsa-will
wie-obama-ueber-den-dingen-stehen-a-930337.html; Marcel Rosenbach & Holger Stark,
Codename ‘Apalachee’: How America Spies on Europe and the UN, DER SPIEGEL, Aug.
26, 2013.
43. Article 17 of the ICCPR protects individuals against arbitrary or unlawful
interference with privacy, the family, the home, and correspondence. G.A. Res.
2200A(XXI), art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966).
44. Articles 22, 24, and 27(2) of the VCDR, in particular, protect the premises and
communications of the diplomatic mission, which are violated when the mission is
bugged by another state’s organs. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations arts. 22,
24, 27 ¶ 2, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
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A major coalition partner within the German Government, the Social
Democrats (SPD), has demanded that the Bundestag investigate the
evidence released by Snowden,45 while Spain’s public prosecutor launched
a preliminary inquiry after news emerged that the NSA had intercepted
over 60 million phone calls in Spain over the course of just one month.46
The European Parliament has voted in favour of investigating the
surveillance activities of the United States on European citizens and has
condemned NSA spying on its representations.47 Moreover, in Mexico a
legislative commission has called for internal investigation into the
nation’s standards of data protection,48 while Brazil has been prompted
to change its data protection laws.49 Upon the initiative of Germany and
Brazil,50 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution aimed at protecting
privacy in the digital age on December 18, 2013.51 Although the wording
of the resolution omitted the original intent that mass surveillance explicitly
be characterized as a human rights violation, it does clarify that the idea
of privacy is not obsolete in the digital age and that, to the contrary, citizens
continue to enjoy the same privacy rights online as they do offline.52
Action has also been taken in the United States itself: the Senate has
announced its intention to launch an investigation of all secret service

45. Spähaffäre: SPD fordert NSA-Untersuchungsausschuss, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct.
27, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/spaehaffaere-oppermann
fordert-nsa-untersuchungsausschuss-a-930222.html.
46. Spain Launches Legal Inquiry into U.S. Spying Allegations, supra note 41.
47. Press Release, European Parliament, Parliament to Launch In-Depth Inquiry
into US Surveillance Programmes (July 8, 2013), available at http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130701IPR14770/html/Parliament-to-launch-in-depth
inquiry-into-US-surveillance-programmes.
48. SEGUNDA COMISÍON: RELACIONES EXTERIORES, DEFENSA NACIONAL Y EDUCACÍON
PÚBLICA, DICTAMEN CON PUNTO DE ACUERDO QUE EXHORTA A DIVERSAS DEPENDENCIAS
DE LA A DMINISTRACIÓN P ÚBLICA F EDERAL A RENDIR UN INFORME SOBRE EL USO DEL
SOFTWARE PARA ESPIONAJE “FINFISHER” EN ACTIVIDADES DE RECOLECCIÓN DE INTELIGENCIA
(2013), available at http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/Archivos/Documentos/ 2013/07/asun_
2992645_20130731_1375375137.pdf.
49. Glüsing et al., supra note 40.
50. Anja Fähnle, Germany and Brazil Want UN Vote on NSA Spying, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.dw.de/germany-and-brazil-want-un-vote-on-nsa-spying/
a-17193657.
51. G.A. Res. 68/167, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/167 (Dec. 18, 2013).
52. See Edith M. Lederer, UN Votes to Protect Privacy in Digital Age, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/security-it/un-votes
to-protect-privacy-in-digital-age-20131219-hv6h5.html.
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programmes,53 while the government is considering allowing amicus curiae
to be filed at the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court54 and creating
an independent review panel—steps intended to halt more intensive
surveillance on private persons where there are not sufficient grounds to
believe they pose a threat to national security.55 President Barack Obama
has also ordered NSA spying at the UN, International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and World Bank to be curtailed or halted, despite the fact that
spying operations at those institutions—presumably of the offices of
national representatives—had not been made public.56 This indicates that
such leaks can prompt pre-emptive compliance as states fear the
consequences of as-yet-undiscovered violations. Perhaps most significantly,
Snowden’s revelations have enabled citizens in the United States to bring
lawsuits against government officials and telecommunications companies
implicated in conducting mass surveillance on American citizens residing in
the United States.57
The information revealed by Edward Snowden has prompted both
modest corrective behaviour on the part of the United States that is
particularly focused on bringing itself back into compliance with
international law in the form of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, as well as robust action on the part of other states to prevent
such violations against their own citizens in future. Thus, even if the
perpetrator state is unwilling to substantially alter its conduct, norms of
international law can be enforced by enabling other states to take
protective action on the basis of the leaked information. This also holds
true when those states have previously been complicit in violations against
their own citizens. States are not monolithic entities and international
law violations may be perpetrated by a small group of individuals or
state organs, especially where appropriate oversight is lacking. In these

53.
54.

NSA Überwachung: US-Senat Will Handy-Affäre Untersuchen, supra note 40.
Christi Parsons & Ken Dilanian, Obama calls for Changes to Patriot Act, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 9, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/09/news/la-pn
obama-patriot-act-oversight-20130809.
55. Obama Pledges Surveillance Changes, THE IRISH INDEPENDENT (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.independent.ie/world-news/obama-pledges-surveillance-changes-29487228.html;
Barack Obama Pledges Changes to Restore Trust in NSA Surveillance Programs, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 10, 2010, 6:44 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-10/obama-pledges
changes-to-restore-trust-in-nsa-spying/4877886.
56. Mark Hosenball, Obama Halted NSA Spying on IMF and World Bank
Headquarters, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2013, 6:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/
31/us-usa-security-imf-idUSBRE99U1EQ20131031.
57. Klayman v Obama, No. 13-0881, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176925 (D.D.C. Dec.
16, 2013).
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cases, revealing this complicity may enable other state organs to take
corrective action.58
Of course, not all cases of external whistleblowing result in such clearcut repercussions—the precise impact of the information revealed by
Katharine Gun or Anat Kamm remains, by its very nature, more difficult
to assess. This difficulty, however, is symptomatic of most methods of
law enforcement and does not negate the fact that external whistleblowing
can play an important role in encouraging international law compliance,
if not necessarily producing quantitatively measurable results in every
instance. Furthermore, the identity of the states concerned is also a factor in
responsiveness to all forms of whistleblowing. Some states and governments
may be more sensitive to allegations of international law violations and
more willing to investigate and take corrective action, while other states
may show more resistance under the same or similar circumstances. The
point remains that external whistleblowing can increase the level of state
commitment to enforcing international law to the benefit of those
affected by the violations in a direct and traceable fashion as demonstrated
by the above examples.
C. Internal Whistleblowing as an Adequate Alternative?
A Comparison
Going public with evidence of international law violations would seem to
be effective in aiding compliance in certain cases, but is it necessary?
This is a worthy point because security leaks, i.e., precisely those leaks
that tend to have the most relevance for international law, inherently risk
jeopardizing a state’s internal security and it is therefore unlikely that
many states would wish to unconditionally endorse it as a method of
enforcing international law. Moreover, military and intelligence personnel
who witness breaches of international law often have the option of
internal whistleblowing, i.e., communicating their concerns to superiors
or internal agencies, and in some jurisdictions even to external bodies.59

58. Borger, supra note 41. (revealing a level of cooperation between the intelligence
services of a number of Western European countries in the mass, warrantless surveillance of
their own citizens).
59. U.S. Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1034(a)(1) (1988)
(stating that no one “may restrict a member of the armed forces in communicating with a
Member of Congress or an Inspector General” provided the communication is lawful;
§ 1034(b) prohibits reprisals).
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Utilizing internal whistleblowing procedures ensures that any accusation
that could compromise state security does not lead to irreparable damages to
that state’s international relations or defence policy. In the ideal scenario,
the whistleblower is able to “enforce” through these internal mechanisms
and therefore has no need to reveal information to the public, an action
which could potentially entail hazardous consequences. However, it is wellknown that there are many reasons for whistleblowers to prefer external
disclosure, such as a lack of confidence in internal procedures, urgency, or
fear of reprisals,60 such as harassment or ostracism.61 Others go further,
arguing that the “official channels” serve as little more than a mechanism
for deflating the impact of whistleblower activity because “whistleblowers
are a potential threat to nearly everyone in powerful positions and thus
need to be domesticated. . . . Given that the procedures involved may take
months or years while the problem remains unchallenged, this provides a
perfect method to minimize challenges to organizational hierarchies.”62
Regardless of the truth this may have for domestic whistleblower
protection, it certainly resonates for the majority of international law
violations, especially those which occur within the secrecy-cloaked context
of military and intelligence operations. Due to the hierarchical nature
and vertical structure of military and defence organizations, in many
cases the potential whistleblower’s superiors will have prior knowledge
of the activities concerned. This is especially the case when the violations
are pervasive. In such circumstances, even reporting to parliamentary
bodies (as foreseen in the US Military Whistleblower Protection Act of
1988)63 may prove futile, as it may not be politic for parliamentarians to
question the tactics used in a conflict which they themselves have
authorized, or those who are willing to question such tactics may lack the
clout to take effective action.64 Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that
international law violations committed repeatedly and with impunity by the
agents of a state form part of that state’s official or unofficial policy. In such
a situation it is unrealistic to expect that state’s whistleblowing laws to
operate in optimal fashion and lead, by themselves, to long-lasting correction

60. See Latimer & Brown, supra note 3, at 777.
61. Martin, supra note 2, at 119 (writing in the context of civilian whistleblowing).
62. Id. at 122–23.
63. 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1988).
64. This was made particularly obvious in the case of Daniel Ellsberg. Ellsberg
successfully delivered the Pentagon Papers to a number of US Senators, but this did not
result in effective action. Susan Gardner, Conversations with Daniel Ellsberg, Part 1,
DAILY KOS (Jan. 20, 2006, 2:53 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/01/20/
179996/-Conversations-with-Daniel-Ellsberg-Part-1); see also Guja v. Moldova, 2008-II
Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001
85016 (acknowledging that even whistleblowing to Parliament might prove ineffective).
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of international law infringements. While, by their very nature, cases
of internal whistleblowing are non-public and therefore difficult to
systematically assess, the example of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal
is illustrative in this context.
1. Abu Ghraib and the Taguba Report
In early 2004, Sergeant Joe Darby was stationed at Abu Ghraib prison
in Iraq when a fellow soldier handed him a CD containing, inter alia,
images of Iraqi prisoners being humiliated and severely abused by
soldiers stationed at the prison contrary to international human rights and
international humanitarian law.65
Unlike the other whistleblowers examined in this paper, Darby does
not seem to have considered the actions depicted in these photos in terms
of international law violations (although many of them undoubtedly
are);66 instead, he described the content of the photos as simply ‘not sitting
right’ with him.67 Shortly after receiving the photographs, Darby turned
65. Although some of the photos have been widely circulated publicly, those
depicting the most severe forms of abuse are rarely, if ever, shown, due to their graphic
and disturbing nature. Seymour M. Hersh, The General’s Report, THE NEW YORKER
(June 25, 2007), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/06/25/070625fa_fact_hersh.
66. For example, forcing detainees to perform sexual acts, rape, beatings, enforced
stressed positions, and even killing detainees. Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, THE
NEW YORKER (Nov. 14, 2005), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/11/14/051114fa_fact?
currentPage=1. These actions were committed by US military and intelligence forces and
contravene both international human rights and international humanitarian law. Seymour
M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER (May 10, 2004), http://www.
newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact?currentPage=1); see also MAJ. GEN.
ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE
BRIGADE (2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html#ThR1.13.
67. Darby’s exact words were: “The ones of prisoners being beaten, or the one
with a naked Iraqi sitting on his knees in front of another naked Iraqi, some of the more
sexually-explicit-type stuff to humiliate the prisoners – it just didn’t sit right with me.”
Wil S. Hylton, Prisoner of Conscience, GQ MAGAZINE, Sept. 2006. He continued: “I’ve
kept a lot of secrets for soldiers. In the heat of the moment, in a war, things happen. You
do things you regret. I have exceeded the proper use of force myself a couple of times.
But this crossed the line to me.” Id. This illustrates the difficulty that accurately assessing
international law presents for the non-practitioner. Darby revealed what are unquestionably
violations of international law (the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions explicitly
concern themselves with the protection of prisoners in conflict situations, while Art. 6
ICCPR protects the right to life and Art. 7 ICCPR prohibits torture, as well as cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment, as does the Convention Against Torture). Nonetheless,
Darby apparently did not even consider international law as a motivation for reporting
his colleagues. This difficulty is discussed more thoroughly below.
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them over to the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID).68 The
CID’s initial actions were promising; those responsible for the abuse
were immediately rounded up as Darby identified them.69 Moreover,
when then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld revealed Darby’s
identity as the whistleblower during a Congressional hearing several months
later, the Army quickly transported Darby back to the United States in
order to prevent reprisals.70
However, despite these positive actions, the episode reveals cause for
serious concern regarding the ability of internal whistleblowing procedures
to adequately combat systemic or widespread international law
infringements. As might be expected, the evidence supplied by Darby
prompted an internal investigation, responsibility for which was assigned to
Major General Antonio Taguba. The Major General completed a report
in March 2004, but later raised accusations that there had been many
irregularities, both in the manner in which the investigation was conducted
and in which his report was received. In Taguba’s opinion, the troops at
Abu Ghraib prison were not acting on their own initiative and he was
prevented from investigating their military superiors, although it was
“standard operating procedure to assume that this had to go higher.”71 In
this opinion, Taguba was joined by the CID, which also complained of
having investigations into prisoner abuse thwarted.72 Taguba’s suspicion
that the severe mistreatment experienced by detainees at Abu Ghraib
prison formed part of a wider policy was partially grounded in the fact
that intelligence agencies (in particular the CIA) were involved in the
abuse.73 How could those higher up the chain of command be unaware
of the situation in Abu Ghraib prison, Taguba questioned, when the
intelligence agencies were taking advantage of it to engage in irregular
practices with regards to prisoner interrogation?74 Darby had even
disclosed at least one incident of intelligence personnel killing a prisoner
whose corpse was depicted in the photographs released.75

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.; Anjani Trivedi, What’s Next for Snowden: 10 Notorious Leakers and How
They Fared, TIME WORLD MAGAZINE (June 10, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/06/10/10
notorious-leakers-and-how-they-fared/slide/abu-ghraib-photo-leak/.
71. Hersh, The General’s Report, supra note 65.
72. Id.
73. Hersh, The General’s Report, supra note 65; Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib,
supra note 66.
74. Hersh, The General’s Report, supra note 65.
75. These photos were among those turned over by Darby. Hylton, supra note 67.
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Taguba also claimed that his investigation was not taken seriously by
those in the highest echelons of power.76 Although Darby turned in the
photographs in January and Taguba completed his report in March,
Congressional hearings were not held until May 2004, shortly after the
photographs and the report were leaked to the press.77 Taguba claimed
that at a conference held with Rumsfeld the day before the then-Secretary of
Defense testified at the Congressional hearings, Rumsfeld stated that he
had neither read Taguba’s report nor viewed the photographs, despite the
fact that both were now widely available via popular media and had been
previously transmitted to the Pentagon.78 In fact, the Department of Defense
had already successfully induced the media, in the form of the news
channel CBS, to delay airing the photographs for two weeks after they
were leaked.79 In light of these facts, it is unsurprising that the evidence
disclosed by Darby has been described as “languish[ing] at relatively low
levels in the chain of command” before it was leaked to the public.80 It is
noteworthy that prior to Darby’s actions, the International Committee of
the Red Cross had visited Abu Ghraib prison twice, documenting and
reporting to the commanding officer, Brigadier-General Janis
Karpinski, “the use of sleep deprivation, forced nudity, shackling,
sensory bombardment, and stress positions.”81 These reports did not
lead to any effective action being taken to halt the torture and abuse.82
The handling of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse would thus seem to
illustrate that “nothing will lead to a response as effectively as the
whistleblower going public through making a disclosure to the media”83
since top-level action was only taken when the photographs became
publicly available, following—if Taguba’s assertions are correct—an
apparent history of obstruction and feigned ignorance.
76. Taguba provided anonymous statements to New Yorker reporter Seymour
Hersh, such as, “I don’t want to get involved by looking [at the photographs provided by
Darby],” as well as what he felt were mocking comments that he had personally received
from high-level officials, Hersh, The General’s Report, supra note 65.
77. See id. (detailing Rumsfeld’s numerous complaints about the report having
already leaked to the press before and during the Congressional hearings).
78. Id. (showing that Rumsfeld later repeated this claim of ignorance during the
Congressional hearings on May 7, 2004).
79. Jared Del Rosso, The Textual Mediation of Denial: Congress, Abu Ghraib,
and the Construction of an Isolated Incident, 58 SOC. PROBS. 165, 172 (May 2011).
80. Id. at 172.
81. Id. at 171–72.
82. Id.
83. Latimer & Brown, supra note 3, at 781.

265

FULLER (DO NOT DELETE)

1/26/2018 2:37 PM

Once the information was in the public realm, the possibility that prisoner
abuse in Iraq was not limited to a small, “rogue” group of low-ranking
soldiers was raised at several points in the ensuing congressional hearings,84
and the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted the Inquiry into
the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody.85 This inquiry pinned ultimate
responsibility for the abuse on superior officers, including finding that
Rumsfeld, as Secretary of Defense, had created an atmosphere in which
soldiers were encouraged to act in overly aggressive and abusive ways to
detainees, as evidenced by the so-called Torture Memos.86
The case of Abu Ghraib thus closely parallels British investigations
into allegations of torture and other forms of mistreatment in Iraq as
exhibited by the inquiries discussed above. As with the British cases,
despite evidence of systematic international law breaches by US armed
forces, a thorough investigation only got off the ground once the evidence
was leaked to the public. Previously, allegations and evidence such as
that brought forward by Darby were treated on a piecemeal basis which
was inadequate to deal with the severity of the situation and which
permitted the majority of perpetrators to act with impunity. This reinforces
the point that internal whistleblowing may work well for coping with
isolated international law breaches, but not for effectively combatting the
widespread or systematic abuse that is condoned by those in positions of
power. Internal whistleblower legislation, in other words, fails at precisely
those times when it is most desperately needed.
2. Internal Whistleblowing as Applied to the Cases of Chelsea
Manning, Katharine Gun, and Anat Kamm
Chelsea Manning’s case points to even more serious internal failures
in military whistleblowing procedure. At the time that Manning leaked
the “Collateral Murder” video to Wikileaks, the military legal review of
the incident had long been closed. In fact, it had been concluded just five
days after the incident took place, and there were no plans to re-investigate
when the video was leaked nearly three years later.87

84. Del Rosso, supra note 79, at 176–77.
85. Senate Armed Services Committee, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in
US Custody, Executive Summary, at xxviii (May 10, 2007) (unpublished executive summary),
available at http://www.levin.senate.gov/download/?id=adc98e54-ae7d-4675-95bd-83eaaf42
0268.
86. See id. at Conclusion 13.
87. US Military ‘Cannot Find Iraq Tape’, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 8, 2010, 10:03 AM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2010/04/20104814952153608.html. Some sources
indicate that two military investigations were conducted, but that both led to the same
result, the conclusion that the gunship’s pilots had acted correctly. Video Shows ‘US Attack’
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The video footage, commonly termed “Collateral Murder” after the
title assigned to it by Wikileaks, shows nearly a dozen men, including
two journalists, being fired upon and killed by an Apache helicopter
under questionable provocation.88 The video then records the gunship’s
crew firing on the driver of a van and two bystanders as they attempt to
load a reporter who had been wounded in the initial attack into the
vehicle.89 The driver of the vehicle, and possibly the two bystanders,
were killed and the driver’s two children, occupants of the van, were
seriously injured in this attack.90 The military report nevertheless justified
the use of lethal force without warning on non-combatant minors and
persons attempting to aid an individual who was, at the very least, hors
de combat, on the grounds that “the Apache pilots thought the van was
to be used as a means of escape for the wounded insurgents.”91 The report
stated, almost immediately thereafter, “[i]t is unknown what, if any,
connection the van had to insurgent activity.”92 No disciplinary action
had been taken against the pilots at the time the video leaked, nearly
three years after the shooting.93 The internal review mechanisms in place
had thus already failed to make a cohesive and convincing determination
of accountability for the incident, which amounted, at least in part, to a
95
war crime,94 or to take effective action to prevent its reoccurrence.

on Iraqis, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 6, 2010, 3:10 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/
2010/04/201045123449200569.html.
88. For details, see infra at 280–83.
89. See minute 6:15–9:01 in the unedited footage from the gunship’s camera. See
wordswithmeaning, supra note 14; see also Tim Arango & Elisabeth Bumiller, For 2
Grieving Families, Video Reveals Grim Truth, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2010, A8 (confirming the
identity of the wounded man seen in the video as reporter Saeed Chmagh).
90. See US soldier on Aftermath of Wikileaks Apache Attack, BBC NEWS (Oct. 28,
2010, 7:10 PM), http://www.webcitation.org/5yGAVeN6S (containing excerpts from
interview with Ethan McCord, the U.S. soldier who evacuated the children from the van
after the attack); see also Families of Victims of 2007 US Helicopter Killing React to
Leaked Video, DEMOCRACY NOW (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/12/
families_of_victims_of_2007_us (confirming that the children in the vehicle were the
driver’s own children in interviews with the driver’s surviving family members).
91. Memorandum for Commander, 2d Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 2d
Infantry Division (MND-B) on Investigation of Civilian Casualties Resulting from an
Engagement on 12 July 2007 in the New Baghdad District of Baghdad, Iraq, at 4, ¶ 9
(July 17, 2007).
92. Id., at 5, ¶ 9.
93. Arango & Bumiller, supra note 89.
94. See discussion infra at 280–83.
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A similar situation arose in connection with the Iraq war logs. In her
chats with ex-hacker Adrian Lamo,96 Manning described how she had
confronted her superior about American soldiers aiding the Iraqi government
in arresting peaceful Iraqi dissidents.97 According to Manning, “[h]e didn’t
want to hear any of it. . . he told me to shut up and explain how we could
assist the FPs [Iraqi Police Forces] in finding *MORE* detainees.”98
Internal whistleblowing in such a scenario would seem to be futile as
superior officers appear to be complicit in international law-violating
behaviour and it is impossible for the whistleblower to know how far
and to whom this complicity extends. In such circumstances, would-be
whistleblowers face a difficult decision, since pursuing an internal
whistleblowing channel, which is unlikely to lead to results, may close
off the possibility of subsequent external whistleblowing, either by directing
suspicion onto the whistleblower or by enabling others to destroy evidence
before it is possible to reveal the wrongdoing to external sources. This is
particularly a risk when international law violations are systemic and
therefore certainly, or very probably, involve those persons whom the
whistleblower would normally be expected to confide in. Perhaps it was
for this reason that neither Anat Kamm nor Katharine Gun pursued
internal whistleblowing procedures. In Kamm’s case, her military superiors
and immediate boss, Yair Naveh, were all involved in formulating the
concrete policy of targeted killing of Palestinian militants that Kamm
perceived as contrary to international law.99 In Gun’s case, the fact that
she received the request to conduct surveillance on other UN Security
Council members in casual e-mail form100 would seem to indicate that
the proposed surveillance was a widely known practice within GCHQ;
furthermore, she was officially working on behalf of a government very
much in favour of the Second Iraq War—the very event which the
surveillance was intended to facilitate—and willing to mete out savage
treatment to persons impeding that goal.101 To expect that internal
95. The report instead put the onus on reporters to make themselves more visible
to military personnel. See Memorandum for Commander, supra note 91.
96. After engaging in lengthy web chats with Manning, Lamo eventually reported
her. Hansen, supra note 12.
97. Manning described their work, which he had arranged for an interpreter to
read to him as “a scholarly critique.” Id.
98. Id. The veracity of this incident was confirmed during Manning’s trial.
Transcript of Closing Argument at 135, United States v. Manning (2013), available at
http://www.bradleymanning.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/072613amsession_F.pdf.
99. Uri Blau, IDF Ignoring High Court on West Bank Assassinations, HAARETZ,
Nov. 26, 2008.
100. Burkeman & Norton-Taylor, supra note 8.
101. See, e.g., the case of Dr. David Kelly who died in July 2003 after he shared
information on Iraq’s weapons capabilities that contradicted the government’s official
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whistleblowing could adequately function in such an environment seems
fanciful.
In short, when states are engaged in all but the most mild or isolated
international law violations, internal whistleblowing mechanisms break
down and whistleblowers turn to attempting to force state actors into
compliance by exposing them to public pressure and condemnation
through external whistleblowing. The European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) has acknowledged in its jurisprudence the problem that
system-wide internal failures could present for whistleblowers.
3. Guja v. Moldova—Internal Whistleblowing “Clearly Impracticable”
The case of Guja v. Moldova concerned a civil servant, Guja, who had
released letters to the press that he believed showed high-ranking Moldovan
officials intervening in criminal investigations.102 Dismissed from his
post for revealing state secrets,103 Guja defended his actions on the grounds
that the information he had disclosed was of major public interest and
that he had been forced into public disclosure since Moldova lacked
appropriate whistleblower legislation.104 Guja had felt unable to reveal
the evidence to his superiors, since he had reasonable grounds to believe
that they would simply destroy it.105 He also claimed that he could not
confide in Parliament as it was dominated by the Communist Party, in
which the implicated officials were high-ranking members.106 The ECtHR
decided in favour of Guja and found that:
the signalling by a civil servant or an employee in the public sector of illegal
conduct or wrongdoing in the workplace should, in certain circumstances,
enjoy protection. This may be called for where the employee or civil servant
concerned is the only person, or part of a small category of persons, aware of

position. Andrew Gilligan, The Betrayal of Dr. David Kelly, 10 Years On, THE
TELEGRAPH (July 21, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10192271/
The-betrayal-of-Dr-David-Kelly-10-years-on.html. Kelly was discovered as the source
of the leak and bullied by government officials as a result of his disclosures. Id. It is
possible that he took his own life as a consequence of this intimidation. Id. Although
Kelly’s death occurred several months after Gun leaked the NSA e-mail, it is indicative
of the general atmosphere of hostility towards government employees speaking to the
press on the issue of Iraq at the time.
102. Guja v. Moldova, 2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R., at 3–6, ¶¶ 9–18 (2008).
103. Id. at 6, ¶ 21.
104. Id. at 18, ¶¶ 61–62.
105. Id. at 18, ¶ 62.
106. Id.
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what is happening at work and is thus best placed to act in the public interest by
alerting the employer or the public at large. . . . In the light of the duty of
discretion referred to above, disclosure should be made in the first place to the
person’s superior or other competent authority or body. It is only where this
is clearly impracticable that the information could, as a last resort, be disclosed
to the public.107

The ECtHR decided that Guja was acting under this last resort scenario108
and “reiterates in this context that open discussion of topics of public
concern is essential to democracy, and regard must be had to the great
importance of not discouraging members of the public from voicing their
opinions on such matters.”109 Thus, the ECtHR decided that Guja’s
freedom of expression, as protected under Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, had been violated when he was punished
by dismissal for his disclosures.110
Of course, Guja’s case was a civilian one and did not concern sensitive
military information. Nonetheless, the “clearly impracticable” criterion
could, at least in theory, be analogously applied in non-civilian situations,
especially when grave breaches of international law are at stake. Even if
legal protection is not extended to such whistleblowers, it should still be
acknowledged that internal whistleblowing is at times impractical, and
that simply not whistleblowing in such cases is a deeply unsatisfactory
outcome for international law, given the critical role that external
whistleblowing has filled in addressing serious and systematic violations.
As the defence in Private Manning’s trial stated, in situations where
internal whistleblowing proves to be impractical, “giving something to a
legitimate news organization is, unfortunately or fortunately, depending
on what side of the fence you are on, the way we hold our Government
accountable.”111
III. EXTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Quite apart from the effectiveness of whistleblowing as an international
law enforcement mechanism, however, is the question of how it fits, or
could fit, into the broader framework of national and international law.
This is, of course, no simple task. International law is a complex
discipline fraught with contested versions of that law’s substance, and
military whistleblowers are prosecuted under domestic, not international
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

270

Id. at 21, ¶¶ 72–73.
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Id. at 26, ¶ 97.
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law, usually by the very government whose actions they have revealed.
Any treatment of this issue must take all of these considerations into
account. The remainder of this paper is devoted to a brief exploration of
how whistleblowing could be embedded as an enforcement mechanism
in the context of international law.
A. The Tricky World of International Law
An obvious objection to any integration of a role for whistleblowers in
the international framework is the complexity of the subject matter at
hand. Whistleblowers expose wrongdoing,112 but how, in the context of
international law, does the whistleblower know when wrong has been
done? There are many practices that are commonplace in international
law; for example, vote-buying at international institutions,113 the domestic
equivalents of which would be punishable under most national legal
systems, but which do not breach any international law norms. Even in
cases where a fairly clear and well-established international law norm is
concerned, it can be difficult for a whistleblower to know whether or not
the behavior in question has violated that norm. The fear is thus that any
protection of such whistleblowers would open the floodgates to spurious, or
well-meaning but erroneous, claims of international law violations, all of
them potentially detrimental to the state’s well-being. It is thus necessary
to ask, in the interests of contemplating any future protective regime,
what demands should be placed on the international law capabilities of
the whistleblower to allow for exposure of international law violations,
especially systemic violations, without unduly compromising state security.
This is a difficult question and the following examples shed some light
on this very problem.
1. Anat Kamm—Targeted Killings
While completing her compulsory military service in the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF), Anat Kamm discovered documents which she believed
revealed that the IDF had been conducting targeted killings of Palestinian
112. See Martin, supra note 2, at 122; Latimer & Brown, supra note 3, at 768.
113. Ofer Eldar, Vote-Trading in International Institutions, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 3
(2008); Roslyn Fuller, Democracy and International Law: An Analysis of the Origins of
Democracy, its Relationship with International Law and its Applicability to Modern
Institutions 275–82 (2010) (unpublished thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, on file with the
author).
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militants114 in a manner that not only contravened a 2006 Israeli High
Court ruling,115 but which, in her view, constituted war crimes.116 On the
basis of this conviction, Kamm copied, and requested fellow soldiers to
copy for her, approximately 2,085 documents, including over 700 highly
classified documents, onto CD. Upon the conclusion of her military service,
she provided 1,500 of those documents, including 150 highly classified and
330 classified documents, to journalist Uri Blau,117 who published a
newspaper article based on the information.118
Some of the documents Kamm provided to Blau, and which he
referenced in his publications, focused on the case of Ziad Malaisha.
Malaisha was a leading figure in the Palestinian militant organization
Islamic Jihad who had been killed by Israeli forces approximately six
months after the Israeli High Court had delivered its interpretation of
international humanitarian law norms vis-à-vis targeted killings.119 In its
judgment, the Court, drawing on a wide background of scholarly opinion,
essentially approved the policy of targeted killing,120 but subjected it to
certain limitations, including that only those civilians directly taking part
in hostilities could become the object of a targeted killing.121 Somewhat
114. Targeted killing is a pre-emptive military strategy employed by the IDF which
entails killing known militants in surgical strikes in order to prevent them from participating in
further attacks against Israel. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of
Isr. 2006(2) PD 459, 464, ¶ 2 [2006] (Isr.).
115. Id. at 465.
116. Luvitch, supra note 10.
117. Abe Selig, Indictment Says Kamm Sought to Harm State Security, JERUSALEM
POST (Aug. 4, 2010, 10:35 PM), www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=172699; Peled,
supra note 9; Joanna Paraszczuk, Court Rules: Anat Kamm to Begin Prison Term,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 18, 2011, at 6.
118. See Blau, supra note 99.
119. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 2006(2) PD
459 [2006] (Isr.). Malaisha died in 2007. See Elad Benari, Who was Ziad Malaisha of the
Anat Kam Affair?, SHALOM LIFE (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.shalomlife.com/news/10205/
who-was-ziad-malaisha-of-the-anat-kam-affair/; Scandal over Israeli Army’s Illegal Operations,
RUSSIA TODAY (Apr. 14, 2010, 7:25 AM), http://rt.com/news/palestine-israel-army-killings/.
120. A position that enjoys widespread support in scholarly literature on the topic.
See, e.g., J. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: Targeted Killings under
International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069 (Mar. 2002) (arguing for the legality of targeted
killings in Palestine); Howard A. Wachtel, Targeting Osama Bin Laden: Examining the
Legality of Assassination as a Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 677 (Dec. 2005)
(differentiating between assassination and targeted killing in regards to Osama bin
Laden); Jonathan Ulrich, The Gloves Were Never On: Defining the President’s Authority
to Order Targeted Killing in the War against Terrorism,45 VA. J. INT’L L. 1029 (Summer
2005); Philip Alston, The Challenges of Responding to Extrajudicial Executions:
Interview with Philip Alston, 2 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 355 (Nov. 2010) (elaborating on the
criteria to be used for determining the legality of a targeted killing).
121. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 2006(2) PD
459, ¶ 60 [2006] (Isr.).
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controversially, however, the Court held that anyone who joins a “terrorist
organization” which becomes his “home”, and in the framework of his
role in that organization commits a chain of hostilities with short periods
of rest between them loses his immunity from attack “for such time” as
he is committing the chain of acts; “[i]ndeed, regarding such a civilian,
the rest between hostilities is nothing other than preparation for the next
hostility.”122
Nevertheless, the Court stressed that even in such cases, the armed
forces have a duty to observe the principle of proportionality in conducting
missions and thus to do “everything possible to minimize collateral damage
to the civilian population.”123 The Court specifically stated that this duty
entails using less harmful means than targeted killing wherever possible.
Therefore, “if a terrorist taking a direct part in hostilities can be arrested,
interrogated, and tried, those are the means which should be employed,”124
and, though not always possible, arrest must “always be considered.”125
Ultimately, however, the Court accorded military forces wide discretion
to determine when a strike should be deemed proportionate.126
Kamm’s documents threw some light on precisely how the Court’s
decision was being implemented in practice within the IDF. These
documents revealed that in a meeting on March 28, 2007, IDF Major
General Yair Naveh had stated that in the course of a planned mission
against Palestinian militants arrest was the preferred option, but if one of
Islamic Jihad’s leaders was identified, at which point he specifically named
three men, including Malaisha, “the force has permission to kill them,
according to the situation assessment while carrying out the mission.”127
In several follow-up meetings, senior officers ironed out the details of
what they considered to be proportionate collateral damage to the
assassination of Malaisha, prospectively in a travelling vehicle, including
such suggestions as “another two people,” not “more than five people,”

122. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 39.
123. Id. at ¶ 26.
124. Id. at ¶ 40 (referencing McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97
(1995), in which three IRA members were shot dead by British agents in the streets of
Gibraltar. In that case, the ECtHR had ruled that Britain’s actions had contravened the
European Convention on Human Rights).
125. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 2006(2) PD
459, ¶ 40 [2006] (Isr.).
126. Id. at ¶ 59.
127. Blau, supra note 99.
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and not more than one unidentified person.128 The military also classified
Malaisha’s arrest as “impractical” and according to the documents obtained
had listed arrest only as an “alternative action,”129 an assessment which
could be questioned in light of the fact that Malaisha had previously
been arrested and had spent over three years in jail.130 Despite these
preparations, the mission was never realized and Malaisha was killed in a
gun battle that erupted during an Israeli raid into the West Bank.131
Notwithstanding the ultimate outcome of the particular case of Malaisha,
Kamm felt that the IDF’s approach to targeted killing, revealed in the
documents she released, violated international law.132
Whether the IDF’s actions were compliant with international law thus
depends on two factors: first, was the High Court’s interpretation of the
international laws of warfare correct, and second, was it faithfully
implemented by the IDF?
While Malaisha had undoubtedly made a “terrorist organization” his
“home” and was thus according to the Israeli Court’s definition,
theoretically a legitimate mark for targeted killing, the Court’s decision
itself is but one interpretation of international law and has been criticized
for, among other things, allegedly erroneously qualifying the conflict
between Israel and Palestinian militias as international in nature.133
It is suggested here that in declaring all those who have joined a “terrorist
organization” to be constantly taking part in hostilities, even when engaged
in activities that are not at all related to the conflict, the Court may have
interpreted Article 51(3) of the First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions134
too widely. This interpretation would appear to assess the time period
under which a person can be qualified as “directly taking part in hostilities”
in rather generous terms and thus allow militia leaders to be targeted
while engaged in such mundane and non-threatening activities as buying

128.
129.

Id.
Uri Blau, IDF Rejects Claims it Killed Palestinians in Defiance of Court,
HAARETZ, Nov. 27, 2008.
130. Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, Haaretz’s Alleged ‘Reporter Spy’ Studied under AntiZionists, ARUTZ SHEVA (Nov. 4, 2010, 12:28 PM), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/
News/News.aspx/136931; Benari, supra note 97.
131. Scandal over Israeli Army’s Illegal Operations, supra note 119.
132. Specifically referring to them as “war crimes”. Luvitch, supra note 10; Ofra
Edelman, Anat Kam: I stole IDF Documents to expose West Bank War Crimes, HAARETZ
(Apr. 12, 2010, 4:30 PM).
133. Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren Michaeli, Legality of Preventive Targeted Killings
- International Armed Conflict, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 459 (2007).
134. Article 51(3) states that civilians directly participating in hostilities lose their
protection from military attack. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) art. 51, ¶ 3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
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groceries or watching television.135 While the Court self-corrected this
seemingly wide interpretation of Article 51’s wording by requiring
observance of proportionality,136 the IDF may have overstepped the
Court’s boundaries in regards to proportionality in pre-determining
Malaisha’s arrest to be impractical. Thus, if a war crime did exist, it could
only lie in the combination of the Court’s relatively wide interpretation
of Article 51(3) of the First Protocol and the IDF’s plan to slightly overstep
the boundaries set by the Court’s guidelines on proportionality. With
regards to international law, the entire situation could thus perhaps best
be described not as a flagrant violation, but as “pushing the envelope.”
Moreover, as the proposed mission in regards to Malaisha was never
realized, Kamm’s disclosures did not so much reveal a specific war crime
as raise questions about how other targeted killings may have been conducted.
Thus, in a case where even the Israeli High Court had felt that the exact
contours of legitimate targeted killing were difficult to assess,137 Kamm
took it upon herself to interpret where that precise boundary lay.
This is not to suggest that Kamm did not believe that war crimes were
being perpetrated, nor does it diminish the importance of revealing
information in an atmosphere where lives are at stake. It merely illustrates
the difficulty posed by whistleblowing in international law of ascertaining
what the law is in an area where hard contours are unclear even to
practitioners. The Tel Aviv District Court took note of this point during
its investigation: According to Justice Ze’ev Hammer, as expressed in
135. Or, for example, a lengthy return to one’s residence to engage in mundane
household chores, to care for one’s relatives, or to participate in religious or social
activities, such as a marriage in the family. Alternatively, one could imagine a falling-out
with other members of the organization leading to a lengthy cessation of activity.
136. Presumably it would be less problematic to effect an arrest in situations where
the militant is not presently directly engaged in armed activity.
137. The Court, in fact, noted that it was beyond its abilities to exhaustively
describe when a civilian could be considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities. HCJ
769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 2006(2) PD 459, ¶¶ 33–37
[2006] (Isr.). Nevertheless, it circumscribed a fairly wide array of activities, which in its
view could certainly be subsumed as “direct participation in hostilities”, including:
preparing oneself for hostilities; collecting intelligence on the army; transporting unlawful
combatants to or from a place where hostilities are taking place; operating weapons or
supervising their operation; or driving a truck of ammunition to a place where it will be
used for the purposes of hostilities. Id. The Court also decided that anyone acting as a
human shield out of “their own free will” was taking a direct part in hostilities, as were
participants up the entire chain of command, including those who send a militant on his
mission, those who plan the attack, and those who decide that the attack should be
carried out. Id.

275

FULLER (DO NOT DELETE)

1/26/2018 2:37 PM

his summation, Kamm had “failed to explain her sudden expertise in
international law and the highly complex definition it gives for war
crimes.”138 The Supreme Court in its decision on Kamm’s sentencing
appeal also weighed in on this theme, accusing Kamm of taking the law
into her own hands139 and of usurping the position of a lawyer.140
This focus on the whistleblower’s level of expertise is worth considering;
after all, how can a whistleblower claim to be acting in the interests of
international law enforcement when they do not possess clear information
regarding the content of international law? Equally, how could a
whistleblower form the reasoned conviction that an international law
violation has occurred in what many experts would consider to be, at most,
a borderline case? Conversely, if a whistleblower is in a position to know
that a war crime has been committed, would disclosing that information,
potentially even to the public, as Kamm did, be more easily justified?
Focusing on the whistleblower’s knowledge raises some important points
for consideration: what of the case where the whistleblower was not in a
position to accurately assess whether an international law violation had
been committed, but nevertheless revealed what any expert would
acknowledge to be a serious, if subtle, violation, such as a breach of
territorial sovereignty, the laws of the sea, or the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations? Alternatively, had Kamm exposed a sufficiently
flagrant violation of international law, such as a planned genocide or
aggressive war, would the court have considered that she was in a position
to know that this represented a violation of international law even without
“expertise” or formal training?141 In other words, would the court accept
that the non-specialist, while possibly unaware of the intricacies involved,
possesses some rudimentary knowledge of the most fundamental points
of international law? After all, not all violations of international law are
subject to “highly complex” definitions: genocide and aggressive warfare,
in particular, can be committed in quite straightforward, obvious fashion.
Despite these questions, which must at this point remain open, the
Israeli courts’ interest, fleeting as it was, in a differentiated level of
knowledge in relation to a whistleblower’s right to make disclosures in
the pursuit of enforcing international law norms remains a useful approach
to a difficult situation, one that finds parallels in domestic law.142

138.
139.
¶ 6.
140.
141.
142.
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Luvitch, supra note 10.
See discussion infra at 287.

FULLER (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 15: 249, 2014]

1/26/2018 2:37 PM

A Matter of National Security
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

2. Katharine Gun—The Second Iraq War
Kamm’s case is far from the only example of the difficulties posed in
ascertaining the existence of an international law violation. The case of
Katharine Gun presents perhaps the most significant conundrum vis-à
vis the particular vicissitudes of international law. Gun was employed as
a translator for Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), a
British intelligence agency. On January 31, 2003, she received an e-mail
from the USA’s National Security Agency (NSA) requesting help in
tapping the phones of six UN Security Council members, an action likely
contemplated in the service of giving the USA and UK an edge in the
negotiations on Security Council authorization for military action against
Iraq.143 Gun leaked the e-mail to a friend whom she knew to have contacts
with journalists and the story was eventually published.144 She later reported
herself as the source of the story.145
While bugging the UN missions of other states, and in particular tapping
the phones of these nations’ UN representatives,146 would have contravened
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,147 it does not appear
that this was the international law violation that motivated Gun to leak
the e-mail to the press. Instead, Gun described her motivation as an attempt
to prevent the Second Iraq War and thereby save lives, specifically stating,
after being charged under Section 1 of the UK’s Official Secrets Act of
1989, “I will defend the charge against me on the basis that my actions were
necessary to prevent an illegal war in which thousands of Iraqi civilians
and British soldiers would be killed or maimed.”148
Ironically, however, the Second Iraq War remains illegal only because
the US and UK failed to procure the desired Security Council resolution,
an outcome to which Gun’s actions arguably contributed. Had a Security
Council resolution clearly authorizing force been obtained, the war would
have been legal under international law, and it is uncertain, at best, that
this legality would be reversed by any subsequent revelation that the US
and UK had used intelligence obtained via violations of the Vienna

143. Burkeman & Norton-Taylor, supra note 8.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Ex-GCHQ Officer ‘Preventing War’, supra note 11.
147. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations arts. 22, 27 ¶ 2, Apr. 18,
1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
148. Ex-GCHQ Officer ‘Preventing War’, supra note 11.
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Convention on Diplomatic Relations to manipulate other Security Council
members into voting in line with their wishes.149 Thus, if Gun had refrained
from making her disclosure, and surveillance of the Security Council swing
states had given the US and UK an advantage sufficient to have the
resolution authorizing force passed, the crime of aggression would, for
all intents and purposes, not have been committed. Thus, as strange as it
might sound to the non-international law practitioner, Gun’s actions may
have, from a conditio sine qua non perspective, led to more serious
international law violations than would otherwise have been the case.
Although the case against Gun eventually collapsed when the prosecution
chose not to offer evidence, it does raise some questions as to the extent
of knowledge a whistleblower should have in relation to the international
law violations they intend to disclose. Gun had a general idea that
international law was being violated, but did not appear to have been
fully aware of the precise nature of that violation, given that her intentions
on this point seem to have been more attached to the possibility of a war
than to the surveillance of other nations (although she recognized that
the surveillance was incorrect, she does not appear to have recognized its
full legal significance). Considering the intricacies of international law,
which so often differ from accepted domestic legal norms, this is a point
worth considering. Is it acceptable for whistleblowers to view themselves as
instruments for enforcing international law in cases where they technically
contribute to enforcing a somewhat different, but related, international
law norm than they intended to? Or should only those whistleblowers
whose intentions and knowledge attach to the correct international law
norm be viewed as credible instruments of international law enforcement?
These are not necessarily insurmountable difficulties, but they do reveal
some of the issues raised when we attempt to fit whistleblowers into the
general scheme of international law.

149. There is no acknowledged method of reviewing Security Council resolutions
for their legality—indeed, the ICJ has declined to do so in the past. See, e.g., Legal
Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,
1971 I.C.J. 16, at 23 (June 21). Even if the ICJ were to take the unprecedented step of
reviewing a Security Council resolution, the chain of causality in such a situation would
be difficult to prove, especially against the backdrop of the Security Council’s decisionmaking process in which intense pressure is routinely employed to garner the required
number of votes in favour of resolutions. See Eldar, supra note 113, at 3–41; Fuller,
supra note 113.
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3. Chelsea Manning—Cablegate, War Logs and “Collateral Murder”
Despite being the source of possibly the biggest leak in history, Private
Manning did not make a conclusive judgement on the legality or illegality
of the actions she exposed. Although Manning had not read all of the
diplomatic cables she leaked and much of the information contained
there in is frivolous,150 in her chat logs with Adrian Lamo, Manning
characterized some of the activities recorded in the cables as “crazy, almost
criminal political backdealings” and expressed the hope that her actions
“might actually change something.”151 She later reiterated this sentiment
in her formal statement to court: “The more I read, the more I was
fascinated by the way we dealt with other nations and organizations. I
soon began to think the documented backdoor deals and seemingly
criminal activity didn’t seem characteristic of the de facto leader of the
free world.”152
Unlike Kamm, and to some degree Gun, Manning thus refrained from
making a clear judgment on the legality of the actions she exposed, and
seems to have restricted herself to the position that it was plausible for
her to justifiably suspect that they might be illegal. In this she was at
least partially correct: some of the cables released to Wikileaks have shed
light on international law violations, for example wilful deficiencies in
combatting drug trafficking153 and illegal logging.154 Government
complicity in more serious international law violations is also recorded in
certain cables pertaining to Sri Lanka. In one cable, U.S. embassy officials
state that “responsibility for many of the alleged crimes [in relation to an

150. It should be noted, however, that much of this frivolous information was only
released to the public following a breach of Wikileaks data security. See James Ball,
Unredacted US Embassy Cables Available Online After Wikileaks Breach, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 31, 2011, at 11.
151. Hansen, supra note 12.
152. Bradley Manning’s Personal Statement to Court Martial: Full Text, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2013, 5:58 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/01/bradley
manning-wikileaks-statement-full-text.
153. E.g., Aircraft Down in Honduras and the Seizure of 3.3 Kilos of Cocaine,
WIKILEAKS (Oct. 28, 2002, 3:26 PM), http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/10/02TEGUCIGAL
PA2966.html; Serbia: Fingerpointing Continues in Major Organized Crime Case,
WIKILEAKS (Feb. 24, 2010, 5:37 PM), https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10BEL
GRADE35_a.html (indicating involvement between government and drug traffickers).
154. The Two Papuas: A Consul General’s View, supra note 20 (recording allegations
made by Papua New Guinea’s Consul in Jayapura to the effect that the Indonesian Armed
Forces are involved in illegal logging and drug smuggling in Papua New Guinea).
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extensive government offensive against armed rebel group the Tamil Tigers
in 2009] rests with the country’s senior civilian and military leadership,
including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate
General Fonseka.”155 Another cable alleges that the Sri Lankan government
was colluding with paramilitary groups in criminal activities including
“extrajudicial killings, abductions, [and] child trafficking.”156 All of these
are serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
Similarly, the Iraq and Afghan war logs and related cables reveal
evidence of further human rights violations and complicity in human rights
violations. Examples of these violations include, turning over Iraqis to
Iraqi police in cases where torture was suspected; failing to exercise
proportionality in actions against insurgents or suspected insurgents,
resulting in thousands of civilian deaths; and failing to prevent defence
contractors from engaging in the use of so-called “bacha bazi” (dancing
boys, often also used as child prostitutes) in Afghanistan.157
The most visually arresting evidence of the international law violations
revealed by Manning are those depicted in the video footage now known
as ‘the Collateral Murder video’. This recording originates from the camera
of an Apache helicopter gunship deployed over Baghdad during a military
operation.158 It appears that, while observing a group of armed men
walking through the city, the crew’s suspicions were raised when one of
the cameramen furtively peered around a street corner at a US military
vehicle parked one hundred meters away and then raised his camera to his
face to make a recording.159 The gunship’s crew apparently mistakenly
155. Sri Lanka War Crimes Accountability: The Tamil Perspective, supra note 20.
156. Sri Lanka: GSL Complicit in Paramilitary Factions Human Rights Abuses,
supra note 20.
157. Batty & Doward, supra note 19; David Leigh, Afghanistan War Logs: Secret
CIA Paramilitaries’ Role in Civilian Deaths, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 2010, 5:33 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-civilian-deaths-rules-engagement; John
Nova Lomax, Wikileaks: Texas Company Helped Pimp Little Boys to Stoned Afghan
Cops, HOUSTON PRESS (Dec. 7, 2010, 7:01 AM), http://blogs.houstonpress.com/hairballs/
2010/12/wikileaks_texas_company_helped.php; Jon Boone, Foreign Contractors Hired
Afghan ‘Dancing Boys’, Wikileaks Cable Reveals, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2010, 4:30 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/02/foreign-contractors-hired-dancing-boys.
Regarding the bacha bazi, there is no direct evidence that the boys were abused on this
particular occasion. See Rachel Slajda, State Dept.: No One Touched ‘Dancing Boy’ at
DynCorp Party, TPM (Dec. 9, 2010, 7:48 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/muck
raker/state-dept-no-one-touched-dancing-boy-at-dyncorp-party. Nonetheless, Afghan authorities
were prompted to make numerous arrests relating to the incident. Meeting, Assistant AMB
Mussomeli and MOI Minister Atmar: Kunduz Dyncorp Problem, Transport for Presidential
Candidates and Other Topics, WIKILEAKS (June 24, 2009, 11:37 AM), https://www.
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL1651_a.html.
158. Elisabeth Bumiller, Video Shows 2007 Air Attack in Baghdad That Killed
Photographer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, at A13.
159. Memorandum for Commander, supra note 91, at 1–2.
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believed that he was raising a rocket-propelled grenade launcher to shoot
at the vehicle.160 As a result, the pilots opened fire on the group of men,
killing several of them and seriously wounding one of the cameramen,
later identified as Saeed Chmagh, an employee of Reuters news agency.161
The gunship crew noted that Chmagh was wounded and observed his
attempts to crawl away from the scene of the incident.162 Shortly thereafter,
a van arrived at the scene. The driver of this vehicle and two other men
attempted to load Chmagh into the van.163 The helicopter crew falsely
reported this to ground control as persons picking up bodies and weapons in
an effort to prevent American forces from later examining them.164 The
gunship crew thereby gained permission to fire and did so, killing Chmagh
and the driver of the vehicle (later identified as Saleh Mutashar),165 and
seriously wounding the driver’s two children who had been in the van.166
This second incident is particularly problematic from an international law
perspective.
Even without classifying the precise nature of the conflict,167 a number
of violations of customary international humanitarian law are apparent
from the video footage: the duty to distinguish between civilians and
combatants, the duty to act with proportionality (even if Mutashar had
been removing evidence from the battlefield, the gunship crew could have
first attempted to dissuade him by using non-targeted force or simply
tracked the van from their vantage point), and the duty to exercise care

160. Id.
161. Arango & Bumiller, supra note 89.
162. See minute 6:15–9:01 in the unedited footage from the gunship’s camera. See
wordswithmeaning, supra note 14, also Arango & Bumiller, supra note 89.
163. See minute 6:15–9:01 in the unedited footage from the gunship’s camera. See
wordswithmeaning, supra note 14.
164. The crew makes this claim repeatedly between minute 7:32 and 8:28 in the
unedited footage. See wordswithmeaning, supra note 14.
165. The other two “good Samaritans” may also have perished in the incident.
166. US soldier on Aftermath of Wikileaks Apache Attack, BBC NEWS (Oct. 28
2010, 7:10 PM), http://www.webcitation.org/5yGAVeN6S; Families of Victims of 2007
US Helicopter Killing React to Leaked Video, DEMOCRACY NOW (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/12/families_of_victims_of_2007_us.
167. The incident took place on July 12, 2007, at which point Iraq was no longer
officially occupied and the foreign troops on its territory were present on the basis of
Security Council Resolution 1546 (S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8,
2004)). See David Turns, The International Humanitarian Law Classification of Armed
Conflicts in Iraq Since 2003, in 86 THE WAR IN IRAQ: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 97, 98, 111
(Raul A. Pedrozo ed., 2010).
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in not targeting journalists.168 Customary international humanitarian law
also prohibits attacking persons who are hors de combat169 unless they
are attempting to escape. This is precisely how the military investigator
chose to construe Mutashar’s efforts to load Chmagh into his van—as an
attempt at escape.170 However, the wounded must also receive medical
care without delay,171 and Chmagh was obviously seriously wounded at
the time that Mutashar arrived. It is, we now know, extremely improbable
that Mutashar was helping Chmagh flee the scene of hostilities, given he
was not an insurgent, but a journalist, and therefore devoid of a reason to
flee. Rather, it seems overwhelmingly probable that Mutashar’s intention
was to convey Chmagh to a location where he could receive medical
attention. Moreover, the gunship crew appeared to know that permission
to fire would not be granted if they communicated a true version of events
to ground control. Thus, they lied in saying that Mutashar was picking
up bodies and weapons; they knew this to be untrue for the very good
reason that at that point Chmagh was not a dead body, but in fact very
much alive. It is difficult, under even the most lenient interpretation of
events, to understand how the gunship’s crew could have reasonably
interpreted Mutashar’s actions as helping “insurgents” to escape in a
manner that required the immediate use of lethal force, which endangered
not only Mutashar and Chmagh, but also the two unnamed “good
Samaritans” and Mutashar’s children.
This viewpoint was shared by many others in the immediate aftermath
of the video’s release, including Clive Stafford-Smith, a U.S.-British human
rights lawyer who stated, “I don’t think there’s any question that this is a
violation of the Geneva Conventions,” as well as Chris Cobb-Smith, a
former British army officer, who stated “[e]ngaging the people picking
up the wounded is outrageous. . . . That is against all humanitarian law and
the rules of conflict—most definitely and without a doubt.”172 Others,
such as Bibi van Ginkel, a senior fellow at the Clingendael Netherlands
Institute of International Relations, were more cautious, stating, “[m]y
first guess would be that a war crime was committed. Very simply speaking,

168. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian
Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed
Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS, no. 857, March 2005, at 175, 198, rule 1, 199, rule
14, 201, rule 34.
169. Id. at 203, rule 47.
170. Memorandum for Commander, supra note 91, at 4.
171. Henckaerts, supra note 168, at 207, rule 110.
172. John Cooke, Exclusive: Reuters Chief Spikes Story on Killing of his Own
Staffers in Baghdad, GAWKER.COM (Apr. 8, 2010, 1:09 PM), http://gawker.com/5512623/
exclusive-reuters-chief-spikes-story-on-killing-of-his-own-staffers-in-baghdad (noting that the
original story was filed by Luke Baker on April 7, 2010).
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if people are helping the wounded, they are non-combatants. If force is
used against them, then that is a war crime.”173
The balance of opinion would appear to be that, by releasing the
Collateral Murder video, Manning conveyed evidence of serious
international law violations.
However, despite the wealth of probable crimes that Manning revealed,
she seems to have stopped short of actually holding a concrete belief that
international law violations had been committed. Instead, she chose to
reserve judgement on this point.
Thus, in only these three cases, occurring within the space of just seven
years, we have one whistleblower (Kamm) who held the certain belief that
an international crime was committed, but in reality had merely disclosed
the possibility that a violation may have been contemplated; another (Gun)
who revealed a violation of international law, although not the precise
violation that she thought she was revealing; and a third (Manning) who
revealed dozens of near-certain grievous violations of international law,
but who formed no solid opinion on the legality or illegality of the actions
revealed. Jurisprudence on this particular point is even more scarce since
Gun’s trial collapsed when the prosecution chose not to offer evidence,
and points of international law played no appreciable role in Manning’s
trial. Only in Kamm’s case did the courts briefly address the issue of the
whistleblower’s mental assessment of the legality or illegality of the facts
disclosed.
These cases highlight the fact that we are faced with a situation today
in which many people have an inkling of international law, but few clear
ideas regarding its precise substance. Nonetheless, they may feel beholden
to enforce these vaguely perceived norms, especially in instances where
the lives of others are threatened. Any decision on whether to grant
external military whistleblowers the status of potential international law
enforcers or to offer them protection must therefore balance two different
goods: on the one hand, as in all legal systems, violations cannot be
effectively prevented or punished when those capable of suppressing the
violation have no knowledge of it;174 on the other hand, letting military
173. Id.
174. For this very reason, a wide range of tools are available on the national level
to encourage a free flow of information; for example, laws which obligate all persons
within a state’s jurisdiction to inform the authorities of certain forms of impending criminal
activity. See, e.g., Sec. 138 German Criminal Code, Sec. 9(1) of the Irish Offences against the
State Act (a provision which is used between 60 and 120 times a year. See Oireachtas
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whistleblowers release their information publicly when they do not know or
even have concretely formed ideas on whether or not the behaviour
concerned violates international law is a risky prospect, especially when
such information is militarily sensitive. Nonetheless, due to the serious
nature of international law violations, many of which cause irreparable
damages to the victims, and also the inefficacy of internal whistleblowing
mechanisms in combatting the most widespread and systematic instances
of international law-violating behaviour, it is submitted here that states
should consider introducing legislation which protects external
whistleblowing in certain cases where international law has been breached,
and that international organizations should consider introducing multilateral
instruments which could be helpful in this regard. After all, states have
committed to observing the international law norms in question in all of
the above cases; it is contradictory to punish, and punish harshly, those
who help in attaining that compliance.
However, as the above cases demonstrate, any efforts in this direction
will need to contemplate the level of certainty which an external
whistleblower should possess concerning the existence of international
law violations in those cases where sensitive information is disclosed.
National laws may offer some guidance in this regard; national civilian
whistleblower protection laws generally do not require that whistleblowers
act with certainty in regards to the violations they report, but merely that
they act “on the basis of reasonable belief,” even in some instances
permitting external disclosure on this basis. 175 Such a standard—
implemented on a state by state basis—need not be uniform, but could
demand ‘reasonable belief’ (as in national whistleblower laws), ‘belief
Library & Research Service, supra note 1, p. 7); see also Secs. 38b and 39 UK’s Prevention
of Terrorism Act of 2000 (which was the principal offence in 22 cases between 2001 and
2009. Oireachtas Library & Research Service, supra note 1, p. 8); Additionally, there are
protection programmes which facilitate witnesses to give testimony by mitigating the danger
of reprisals. For example, the Witness Security Program in the USA, established on the
basis of Title V of the Organized Crime Control Act 1970, or the Canadian Federal
Witness Protection Program, established by the Witness Protection Program Act 1996.
175. For example, Canada Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, Section 12
states, “[a] public servant may disclose to his or her supervisor . . . any information that
the public servant believes could show that a wrongdoing has been committed or is about
to be committed, or that could show that the public servant has been asked to commit a
wrongdoing.” Canada Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, S.c. 2005, c.46, § 12
(Can.). The US Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 protects the whistleblower who
“reasonably believes” that their disclosure reveals a violation of the law or gross
mismanagement. Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1989). Section
43B of the UK Public Interest Disclosure Act covers disclosures made under the
“reasonable belief” that they “tend to show” certain listed situations, such as a criminal
offence (Sec. 43B(1)(a)) or a miscarriage of justice (Sec. 43B(1)(c)). Public Interest
Disclosure Act, 1998, c.23, § 43B (U.K.).
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grounded on factual evidence,’ or ‘near certainty.’ Conversely, protection
could be predicated on the whistleblower releasing their information in a
manner which does not inflict any proven harm on the state concerned.
Setting a knowledge bar, especially when exercised in conjunction with the
‘last resort’ requirement as developed by the ECtHR in Guja, and improved
training in the field of international law for all military personnel, would
help to dissuade spurious or well-meaning, but erroneous, cases of external
whistleblowing while establishing a safety valve to facilitate disclosures of
the worst international law violations in a manner that does not demand
unreasonable sacrifices on the part of the whistleblower.
B. The Difficulty of Justification in a Dualist System
As the foregoing considerations indicate, the key difficulty in protecting
those whistleblowers who publicly reveal international law violations
stems from the tension inherent to dualist systems, namely that, in revealing
international law violations, whistleblowers often break domestic laws
and are subject to strict penalties.176 On the surface, these cases seem
clear-cut: the whistleblower has made a disclosure which is specifically
excluded from the protection of domestic laws177 and has thereby made
176. Manning was originally charged with numerous infringements of the US’s
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Some of these charges were incidental to her
final purpose, such as transferring classified data onto her personal computer (UCMJ
Art. 92), while others were more serious, such as communicating national defence
information to an unauthorized source (charged under UCMJ Art. 134), and “aiding the
enemy” (UCMJ Art. 104). These were later supplemented by charges brought under the
Espionage Act of 1917. See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 92, 134, 104, 10
U.S.C. §§ 892, 934, 904 (1956); Charlie Savage, Manning is Acquitted of Aiding the
Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2013, at A1; Wikileaks Source Manning Convicted on Most
Charges, BBC NEWS (July 30, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us
canada-23506213.
Anat Kamm was initially charged with espionage and deliberately intending to harm
state security, an offence which carries a maximum punishment of life imprisonment.
This charge was dropped in exchange for her admitting to charges of possessing and
passing on classified material, which carries a maximum sentence of 15 years imprisonment.
Paraszczuk, supra note 119; Ofra Edelman, Closed-Door Trial Gets Underway for ExSoldier Accused of Passing Classified Documents to Haaretz Reporter, HAARETZ, May,
24, 2010. Katharine Gun was charged with disclosing damaging security information
under Section 1 of the UK’s Official Secrets Act of 1989. Ben Davies, Interview:
Whistleblower Katharine Gun, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2004, 4:02 PM), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3659310.stm.
177. Gun’s disclosure was not protected under the UK Public Interest Disclosure
Act of 1998, article 1, section 43, because according to section 43B(3), a disclosure does
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themselves susceptible to punishment. Thus far, this article has contemplated
legal alterations which may help to overcome the undesirable consequences
of dualism in these cases. However, this may leave the case for increased
whistleblower protection open to the criticism that such a regime, whether
agreed upon multilaterally or subject to state-by-state regulation, is very
much de lex ferenda and thus so farfetched as to be barely worthy of
current contemplation—at best an academic construct which finds little
application or traction in the real world. An investigation of national
jurisprudence, however, indicates otherwise. National jurisprudence on this
issue has been quite differentiated and few courts have unequivocally
denied the possibility that external whistleblowing, even of classified or
sensitive information, could be justified in certain circumstances.
In arguing for their own exoneration, military and intelligence
whistleblowers have traditionally pursued a line of defence that revolves
around two closely related concepts: higher necessity and a conflict of
duties. In recent times this has taken on an added twist: the whistleblower
points out that they were obliged to break domestic laws in order to
reveal violations of international law. This strategy could either be based
on a monist conception of the relationship between international and
domestic law, or could reflect a belief that national laws designed to
implement international laws and give effect to international obligations
are not being observed. Courts have shown a variety of nuanced reactions to
these defences, even to the point where some tentative jurisdictional
trends may be observed.
1. Higher Necessity—Mordechai Vanunu and Ryszard Kuklinski
Neither Mordechai Vanunu nor Ryszard Kuklinski claimed to reveal
violations of international law. However, as military and intelligence
whistleblowers who chose to defend their actions, their cases represent
precedent which is, in some respects, still relevant today. The case of
Mordechai Vanunu holds to the classic perception of how military
whistleblowers could be expected to be treated in cases where they
clearly breach their duties of confidentiality, while Ryszard Kuklinski’s
case resulted in a very different outcome.

not qualify for protection if the person making the disclosure thereby commits an offence.
Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c.23, § 43B (U.K.); see also Davies, supra note
176. Similarly, Manning could not rely on the Military Whistleblower Protection Act of
1998, which allows for disclosure only to certain categories of people, such as members
of Congress.

286

FULLER (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 15: 249, 2014]

1/26/2018 2:37 PM

A Matter of National Security
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

In the early 1980s, Vanunu, an Israeli citizen, was employed as a nuclear
technician at Israel’s Negev Nuclear Research Center (also known as the
“Dimona facility”), where he was bound by a confidentiality agreement.178
Sometime after commencing work at the Dimona facility, Vanunu realized
that his workplace was manufacturing nuclear weapons on a large scale.179
Vanunu was angered to learn of this production, which was being carried
out in secret without the knowledge or consent of most Israeli citizens.180
In early 1985, he took nearly sixty photos which revealed the nuclear
weapons production inside the Dimona facility before leaving Israel and
eventually selling the photos to two British newspapers in 1986.181 Before
the story was published, Israeli intelligence agents abducted Vanunu in
Italy182 and returned him to Israel, where he was convicted by the Jerusalem
District Court of treason and aggravated espionage under Section 113(b)
of the Israeli Penal Code.183 When Vanunu appealed to the Supreme Court
in 1990, the Court rejected his argument that he had been serving a higher
goal (the democratic character of the state) which overrode his duty to
maintain secrecy, endorsing the District Court’s view that ideology could
not be taken into consideration, as it could be made to justify any action.184
Vanunu ultimately spent eighteen years in prison,185 eleven of them in
solitary confinement.186
Despite being argued on similar lines, the outcome could not have
been more different in the contemporaneous case of Colonel Ryszard
Kuklinski. Like Gun and Vanunu, Kuklinski desired to avert the
consequences of armed conflict; in his case the outbreak of hostilities
between the USA and USSR during the Cold War. A high-ranking strategy
officer in the Polish army, Kuklinski had good reason to fear that should
hostilities erupt between the Soviet Union and NATO States, Poland
178. Feldman, supra note 5, at 10.
179. Based on the plant’s production processes, Vanunu estimated output at 200
nuclear weapons. Id.
180. Feldman, supra note 5, at 10; Vanunu: Traitor or Prisoner of Conscience?,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 22, 2004.
181. Vanunu: Traitor or Prisoner of Conscience?, supra note 180.
182. Greg Myre, Israeli who Revealed Nuclear Secrets is Freed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2004.
183. Olenka Frenkiel, Israeli Nuclear ‘Power’ Exposed, BBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/2841377.stm.
184. Feldman, supra note 5, at 13.
185. Vanunu: Traitor or Prisoner of Conscience?, supra note 180.
186. Michael Omer-Man, This Week in History: Vanunu Convicted for Treason,
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 4, 2011.
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would be utterly destroyed in a short-range nuclear war. In an attempt to
save his country from this fate, he contacted the U.S. Embassy in Bonn and
leaked approximately 35,000 pages of classified Soviet military information
to the CIA between 1972 and 1981.187 Kuklinski’s purpose in leaking
these documents was to convince the USA to alter its “World War III”
strategy from that of short-range nuclear attack in the middle of Europe
to a more tactical disruption of Soviet battle units in the USSR, thus
shifting the battleground away from Polish territory. Following his escape
to the USA in 1981,188 Kuklinski’s activity was discovered, and on May
23, 1984, he was sentenced to death in absentia by a unanimous decision
of the Warsaw District Military Tribunal, which stated that he had caused
immeasurable damage to the state security of the entire Eastern Bloc
through the crimes of betrayal and desertion (under articles 122 and 303
of the Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of Poland).189
However, Kuklinski’s case did not end there. In 1995, the Polish Supreme
Court reversed his death sentence on grounds of weak evidence, explicitly
stating: “Proving the fact that Ryszard Kuklinski acted for the sovereignty
and independence of the country inspired by his ideology, should influence
his exculpation.”190 The case was thus referred back to the Military
Prosecutor, who cancelled it on September 2, 1997, because Kuklinski had
acted out of “higher necessity.”191 This is significant because at the time
Kuklinski acted, he was directly aiding the enemy to a degree difficult to
overstate. Nevertheless, he was exonerated on the basis that he had made
his disclosures in pursuit of a higher goal;192 the outcome of the case is
thus flatly at odds with the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision in Vanunu and
highlights the very different reactions that courts may take to similar
arguments.

187. Dariusz G. Jonczyk, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski and his Unique Mission: A
Juxtaposition of the Post-Cold War Outlooks, at 7 (Jan. 1, 2010) (unpublished history
dissertation, Northeastern University) (on file at Northeastern University).
188. Id. at 37–38.
189. Id. at 46.
190. Rewizja Nadzwyczajna w sprawie płk Kuklińskiego (Extraordinary Revision
of the Case of Colonel Kuklinski), 30 March 1995, Rzeczpospolita, 7 April 1995, 17, cited in
translation in id. at 47.
191. Id. at 47.
192. It is alleged that this decision was taken under pressure from the USA (apparently
it was a precondition for Poland joining NATO). It is possible that some pressure was
applied as American officials were very public in their desire to have Kuklinski legally
exonerated at the time envisaged for Poland to join NATO. Id. at 171. However, this
does not change the fact that Poland’s Supreme Court authorized the possibility of
exculpating breaches of state security on the grounds of acting out of higher necessity,
even in cases of directly aiding the enemy.
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2. Conflict of Duties—Matthew Diaz
The basic argument used by Vanunu and Kuklinski was taken up, in a
somewhat different variant, by Matthew Diaz, a Navy Judge Advocate
stationed from 2004–05 at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay
(GTMO). In December 2004, GTMO received a request from Barbara
Olshansky, a lawyer working for the Center for Constitutional Rights in
New York, for information about the prisoners detained there.193 The
request was ultimately rejected by GTMO’s judge advocates in January
2005.194 Despite this decision, Diaz accessed the military computer systems
and printed out the names and some details regarding the identity (for
example, ethnicity and citizenship) of the detainees, as well as details
regarding the interrogation team assigned to each detainee, all of which
was considered to be classified information. He secretly mailed the
information to Olshansky.195 When his actions were discovered, Diaz
was charged with violating a general order, communicating classified
information and removing classified material under Articles 92 and 134
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). He was also charged
under Article 133 of the UCMJ [Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman]. He was subsequently sentenced by court-martial to six
months confinement and dismissal from the Navy.196
Diaz appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces (CAAF), relying in his defence on an alleged conflict of duties
within the domestic legal system. According to the CAAF judgement, these
were:
on the one hand, his duty as a naval officer and an officer of the court to uphold
the Constitution and the rulings of the Supreme Court and the district court in
the habeas cases, and on the other hand, his duty as a Naval officer to maintain
the confidentiality of information that his superiors should have authorized for
release but did not.197

While the CAAF did not agree that Diaz had a legal duty as an officer
of the court to release the information, it agreed that ethical motives

193.
194.
195.

United States v. Diaz, 69 M.J. 127, *5 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
Id.
Jessica Weisberg, Loosening Guantanamo’s Grip: The Story of Matthew Diaz,
NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA (Oct. 27, 2008), http://nacla.org/news/
loosening-guant%C3%A1namos-grip-story-matthew-diaz.
196. Id.
197. United States v. Diaz, 69 M.J. 127, (C.A.A.F. 2010), at 22.
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could be relevant, in particular in relation to the charge under article 133
of the UCMJ, stating “[i]n our view, Appellant’s general point is well
founded.”198 A determination as to whether conduct is unbecoming of an
officer and gentleman includes “taking all the circumstances into
consideration.”199 The court found that “given Appellant’s motive” his
conduct was “not necessarily unbecoming or dishonorable. . . . Evidence
of honorable motive . . . is possible even where the conduct itself amounts
to a delict.”200 Nonetheless, the CAAF concluded that the lower court’s
error did not have a substantial influence on the findings, because it did
not suffice to nullify the illegal action Diaz had committed. The CAAF
here relied on Diaz’s own knowledge that his action was illegal, as
evidenced by his use of a “clandestine method of disclosure—by sending
it through the postal system cut up in a Valentine’s Day card;”201 that the
regulations pertaining to classified information “and for addressing
differences of legal views within the Department” demonstrate “that
Appellant was not legally permitted to disregard the classified nature of
the protected information”; and that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rasul
did not indicate that it “intended its ruling to supersede in some manner
counsel’s other legal and ethical obligations.”202 Thus, while the CAAF
found that Diaz did not have a legal duty to disclose the information, it
admitted the theoretical possibility of such a duty existing in other
circumstances and that motive could play a role in at least some delicts
concerning the release of classified information. Furthermore, the Court
explicitly stated that it is possible for conduct to be honourable even if it
is illegal and that it was significant that Diaz acted furtively, not openly,
in committing the actions in question.
While these three cases are not directly related to exposing violations
of international law, they do contain some important seeds of thought
regarding current cases. While the Israeli courts were adamant in their
refusal to entertain Vanunu’s motives, their American and European
counterparts displayed approaches that were considerably more nuanced.
In Diaz, the CAAF was willing to go so far as to admit that an action is
not necessarily dishonourable even if it involves breaking the law and
that it was certainly conceivable for the duty to withhold classified
information to be judicially balanced against other duties. The Polish
court went furthest of all, explicitly exonerating Kuklinski of unquestionably
domestic crimes in the name of a higher necessity. Courts, even military
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

290

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.

FULLER (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 15: 249, 2014]

1/26/2018 2:37 PM

A Matter of National Security
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

courts, are thus far from closed off to the idea that a conflict of duties
may exist in certain situations, even if the duty concerned is not explicitly
laid down in domestic laws.
3. Conflict of Duties/Higher Necessity under International
Law—Gun, Kamm and Manning
The whistleblowers involved in the three recent cases examined in this
paper, all employed in security and defence-related capacities, continue
the general lines of argument expressed above, but adapted to international
law. Of the more recent cases, Gun’s follows the tradition of pursuing
the justification or exoneration of the whistleblower most closely. Although
Gun was charged with disclosing damaging security information under
Section 1 of the UK’s Official Secrets Act of 1989, the case against her
was eventually dropped because the prosecution chose not to offer
evidence.203 Gun had planned to plead the defence of necessity, in this
case the necessity of preventing loss to human life.204 That the prosecution
dropped a case in which the accused had already confessed raises questions
as to how successful they thought the defence of necessity would be,
both in terms of legal effectiveness and in exposing the state to further
international criticism for its international law violations.
Unlike Gun, Kamm significantly shifted her strategy during the course
of legal proceedings against her. During her initial interrogation by
Israeli intelligence agency Shin Bet, Kamm stated that the information
she had released “should be public knowledge” and that “[w]hen I was
burning the CDs I kept thinking that history tends to forgive people who
expose war crimes.”205 Later, however, she distanced herself from this
stance and described her actions as merely “stupid” and “rash” without
an overarching ideological purpose.206 Instead of attempting to fully
exonerate herself, Kamm agreed to a plea bargain in which the charge of
espionage while deliberately intending to harm state security, an offence
203. Davies, supra note 176. Martin Bright, The Woman Who Nearly Stopped the
War, NEW STATESMAN (Mar. 19, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/
martin-bright/2008/03/katharine-gun-iraq-war-gchq.
204. Bright, supra note 203.
205. Luvitch, supra note 10.
206. See Paraszczuk, supra note 117; Naama Cohen-Friedman, “Kam Testimony
Exposed” YNETNEWS, 10.04.11, 8:15 AM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,
L-4130795,00.html; see also CrimA, 8445/11 Anat Kamm v. State of Israel PM 17959(01)
10, [2011] (Isr.), para. 17.
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which carries a maximum punishment of life imprisonment, was dropped,
and Kamm admitted to possessing and passing on classified material,
which carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment. She
was sentenced to four and a half years in prison, which she appealed to
the Israeli Supreme Court.207 None of the courts in which Kamm’s case
was heard found the renunciation of her original statements credible. All
decisions therefore started from the position that she had indeed passed
the documents to Blau due to a desire to expose war crimes.208
Starting out from this point, Justice Arbel, delivering the Supreme Court’s
decision took a very similar stance to the Court’s findings twenty years
earlier in Vanunu. In particular, she declared that the court had a duty to
punish those who broke rules to fix the world according to their own ideas
of right and wrong.209 However, in his separate but concurring opinion,
Judge Meltzer stated that he would be in favour of reducing sentences
when a crime was committed for altruistic purposes, just as crimes
committed for particularly nefarious motives were often punished with
stiffer sentences.210
Notwithstanding Justice Arbel’s uncompromising stance on ideology,
she voted in favour of reducing Kamm’s sentence due, inter alia, to the
fact that she had already been placed under house arrest for a lengthy
period of time during her trial, and what Arbel considered to be her extrajudicial punishment, namely the social stigma attached to revealing
information which could compromise Israel’s security.211 Kamm’s sentence
was commuted to three and a half years.212
It is extremely doubtful whether Kamm’s sentence would have been
lowered had she passed on the documents for any malicious purpose, such
as direct material gain, her own self-aggrandizement, or harming the
public reputation of the military personnel implicated in the documents.
In the Supreme Court, her case was compared to two others where the
defendants had acted out of carelessness rather than maliciousness.213
207. Joanna Paraszczuk, Supreme Court Hears Kamm’s Sentencing Appeal,
JERUSALEM POST, July 31, 2012, at 5; Peled, supra note 9; Edelman, Closed Door Trial,
supra note 176.
208.
CrimA, 8445/11 Anat Kamm v. State of Israel PM 17959(01) 10, [2011] (Isr.),
para. 2, 17 (referring to the Tel Aviv District Court), para. 2 (and to its own assessment).
209. Id. ¶ 6.
210. Id. at 18, ¶ 2.
211. Id. ¶ 19.
212. Paraszczuk, supra note 117; Edelmann, Closed Door Trial, supra note 176;
Paraszczuk, Sentencing Appeal, supra note 207; Aviel Magnezi, Court Cuts Anat Kam’s
Prison Sentence, YNET NEWS (Dec. 31, 2012, 10:11 AM), http://www.ynetnews.com/
articles/0,7340,L-4326565,00.html.
213. CrimA, 8445/11 Anat Kamm v. State of Israel PM 17959(01) 10, [2011] (Isr.),
¶¶ 13–14.
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While remaining firm on the point that ideological motivations cannot
lead to acquittal, such impetuses apparently can, in the opinion of some
judges, be taken into consideration when sentencing.
Similar to Kamm, during Private Manning’s trial, the defence chose to
portray Manning as young and naïve, insinuating that leaking the
documents had been synonymous with exercising poor judgment coupled
with good intentions.214 Manning herself apologized at her sentencing
hearings stating, “I am sorry that my actions hurt people. I’m sorry that
they hurt the United States,” and admitting, “I should have worked more
aggressively inside the system.”215 However, this was somewhat at odds
with her statement regarding the documents made during trial: “I felt I
had accomplished something that allowed me to have a clear conscience
based upon what I had seen.”216 Regarding the Iraqi dissidents whose
probable torture she had previously objected to, Manning stated:
I knew if I continued to assist the Baghdad Federal Police in identifying the
political opponents of Prime Minister al-Maliki, those people would be arrested
and in the custody of the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police and very
likely tortured and not seen again for a very long time—if ever. . . . Instead of
assisting the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police, I decided to take the
information and expose it to the WLO [Wikileaks Organization], before the
upcoming 7 March 2010 election, hoping they could generate some immediate
press on the issue and prevent this unit of the Federal Police from continuing to
crack down on political opponents of al-Maliki.217

This seems to be an attempt at justifying those actions, although, unlike
Gun and Kamm, Manning did not directly appeal to international law as
a possible justification, despite its obvious relevance for the case at
hand. Manning was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison218 after being

214. See Transcript of Closing Arguments, supra note 98, at 67.
215. Courtney Kube, Matthew DeLuca & Erin McClam, ‘I’m sorry that I hurt the
United States’: Bradley Manning Apologizes in Court, NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2013, 4:07
PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/14/20020933-im-sorry-that-i-hurt-the
united-states-bradley-manning-apologizes-in-court?lite.
216. See Bradley Manning’s Personal Statement to Court Martial: Full Text, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1 2013, 5:58 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/01/
bradley-manning-wikileaks-statement-full-text.
217. Id.
218. It is believed that she could be paroled in as little as 8 years, as time served, as
well as an additional 120 days for harsh treatment, is deducted. See Savage & Huetteman,
supra note 7.
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convicted of multiple counts of theft, espionage, and computer fraud. She is
currently appealing.219
These cases show that courts and governments are, subject to jurisdiction,
while far from lenient, also not quite as condemnatory of external
whistleblowing on international law violations as is often perceived, despite
the complications raised by determining when an international law violation
has been committed and the dualist nature of most domestic legal systems.
Both Kamm and Manning received relatively light sentences and Gun’s
case was dropped completely. Additionally, the cases of Guja, Kuklinski,
Diaz, and Kamm demonstrate that courts are not completely closed off to
arguments of higher necessity, or the possibility of a conflict of duties (be
they with natural law or international law), even in cases where sensitive
information is exposed. Nevertheless, whistleblowers who are motivated
to speak out against violations of international law are often left without
adequate protection, even in cases where states have incorporated
the international laws in question into their own domestic systems. An
international legal apparatus that relies on individuals to expose serious
breaches of its norms should be taking a stronger stance on protecting
anyone actually willing to do so. National courts have already made
some modest headway in this regard and other tentative steps seem to be
forthcoming.
IV. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
History has shown that all states have secrets and that some of these
secrets relate to their own violations of international law, violations
which those states may perceive as important, or even necessary, to give
them an advantage within the international community or even to protect
their citizens or their future existence. Moreover, the most powerful
states operate intelligence services and surveillance programs which put
them in a fairly good position to know about the international law
violations committed by other states,220 revelations which may or may
not be useful to make public. In the short-term, many states thus only
219. Savage, supra note 176; Wikileaks Source Manning Convicted on Most Charges,
supra note 176.
220. For example, the fact that the NSA was spying on civilians and other
governments seems to have been well-known at least within other secret services. Paul
Hamilos, Spain Colluded in NSA Spying on its Citizens, Spanish Newspaper Reports,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:41 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
oct/30/spain-colluded-nsa-spying-citizens-spanish-el-mundo-us; Adam Entous & Siobhan
Gorman, Europeans Shared Spy Data with US, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2013, at A1; NSA
Asked Japan to Tap Region-wide Fiber Optic Cables in 2011, THE JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 27,
2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/10/27/world/nsa-asked-japan-to-tap
regionwide-fiber-optic-cables-in-2011/.
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have a functional interest in whistleblowing when the whistle is being
blown on someone else to their advantage. They do not have an
immediately obvious interest in the double-edged sword that protecting
whistleblowing in general represents.
Nonetheless, many actors do stand to benefit from better whistleblower
protection. For example, states that are largely international law compliant;
the citizens of states that have ratified treaties and who have an interest
in knowing how their own state and other states are performing in relation
to treaty compliance; and citizens of democratic nations who need to
make sound decisions based on complete information.
Furthermore, while states may, in many respects, be guilty of hypocrisy,
they have nonetheless exhibited a profound proclivity for binding
themselves to more exacting standards of conduct. Indeed, the entire
project of international law over the past century represents an enormous
modification of human and state behaviour. This article therefore argues
that states, and more importantly, their citizens, are generally committed
to observing international law, and that the hypocrisy and lapses we
observe, grievous though they are, represent the challenges, setbacks, and
shortcomings on that path. Whistleblowing is an important tool in ensuring
that such setbacks are as short-lived as possible and the importance of this
tool for international law is gaining increased recognition, particularly in
Europe.
The increased value of the role of whistleblowers in international law
enforcement is buttressed by legislation in some European jurisdictions
which lays a domestic duty on the individual to inform of certain
international law violations. For example, under Section 138 of the
German Criminal Code, any person who acquires knowledge that a war
of aggression is being prepared for or that genocide, crimes against
humanity, or war crimes will be perpetrated, could face up to five years
in prison if he does not share his knowledge with the authorities in a timely
fashion.221 To be sure, such legislation authorizes reporting to “the
authorities” only, not to the general public, but it nonetheless escalates the
pressure on the potential whistleblower and exposes them to a situation
where to err on the side of exposure becomes ever more likely. In a system
where withholding knowledge that could prevent grave international law
breaches is punishable, it is unsurprising that citizens perceive a duty to
221. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], 1976, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] 18/989, as
amended, § 138, paras. 1, 5 (Ger.).
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share their information, including with the public, if necessary. Indeed,
under this legislation, Manning, Kamm, and Gun, would all possibly have
made themselves punishable had they failed to share their information
with the relevant authorities. To tell citizens that they must—under threat of
incarceration—tell authorities of these pending international law violations,
but that, should this prove futile, they should continue to withhold
information from the public, is both confusing and illogical as it obviates
the teleological purpose of the law.
This increase in legislation is coupled with increasingly open attitudes
in general towards the role whistleblowers can play in domestic law
enforcement. Indeed, some European States reward whistleblowers for
exposing private violations of their domestic laws, even in cases where
the whistleblower thereby breaks foreign domestic laws, becoming, in
some cases, an accomplice to these crimes. In 2006, the German Federal
Ministry of Finance paid bank computer technician Heinrich Kieber 4.2
million Euros for DVDs which provided evidence that hundreds of wealthy
Germans had been evading taxes by availing themselves of bank services in
Liechtenstein.222 The German state of Rheinland-Pfalz also purchased
information from whistleblowers working in Swiss banks.223 Similarly,
when an HSBC Private Bank employee who had disseminated information
on tax avoidant clients was apprehended in Spain, the Spanish National
Court ruled that his disclosure was protected since he revealed criminal
activity.224 This is mirrored in the United States by Section 922 of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which
foresees substantial rewards for anyone who reveals evidence of securities
and commodities law violations.225
While such whistleblowers aid domestic law enforcement, not
international law enforcement, these examples do seem to indicate an
increased awareness that in cases of widespread breaches, whistleblowing
becomes essential to law enforcement. To apply this to international law
violations then becomes less of a leap, one which the European Parliament
already seems prepared to make, having recently stressed the need for

222. Lynneley Browning, “Banking Scandal Unfolds Like a Thriller” N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2008, at C8; Liechtenstein: BND-Informant hat Todesangst, DER SPIEGEL, Mar.
10, 2008, at 21; Beat Balzli, Matthias Bartsch, Dirk Kurbjuweit, Conny Neumann, Barbara
Schmid & Holger Stark, Ein braver Sohn, DER SPIEGEL (Feb. 25 2008), http://www.spiegel.
de/spiegel/print/d-55946114.html.
223. Giles Broom, Julius Baer Worker Jailed for Three Years for Breaking Secrecy,
B LOOMBERG N EWS (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-08-22/
julius-baer-worker-jailed-for-three-years-for-breaking-secrecy.
224. Id.
225. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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“procedures allowing whistleblowers to unveil serious violations of
fundamental rights” and the importance of providing such people with
the protection they need, including at international level.226 While the
international custom of granting political asylum can be utilized in some
cases— Edward Snowden in particular has thus far used the application of
asylum and extradition rules to his advantage in Russia227—this solution
presupposes the whistleblower’s ability to travel to a third country before
their actions are discovered. Thus, its suitability as a vehicle for
whistleblower protection is limited. When the European Parliament calls
for increased whistleblower protection on an international level, it
presumably means something more than using the existing asylum regime
to one’s advantage.
Among the jurisdictions under consideration in this paper, European
legal systems clearly take the most benevolent stance on external
security-industry whistleblowers. In Europe, such whistleblowers are least
likely to face prosecution (as with Gun) and most likely to have their case
considered within the greater scheme of the legal system’s protected values
when they do (as with Kuklinski and the civilian case, Guja). Moreover, as
the statements by European Parliament indicate, there seems to be an
increasing awareness within Europe that those who reveal serious breaches
of law, including international law, must be protected. Such considerations
are, of course, in their infancy and are, as indicated in this paper, shared
only partially by the USA and Israel. Nonetheless, they represent an
important avenue for future international law enforcement to explore.
V. CONCLUSIONS
External whistleblowing is an effective method of international law
enforcement; indeed, it is necessary in the worst cases where international
law violations attain systemic dimensions. At the same time, however,
those individuals who take the step of external whistleblowing in such
circumstances are often left facing strict domestic penalties for their
actions without adequate legal protection. There are, of course, serious
challenges to any regime of protection for international law whistleblowers,
such as the level of certainty they should be expected to possess that an
international law breach has been committed, and the dualist nature of
226. Press Release, European Parliament, supra note 49.
227. See Vladimir Radyuhin, Snowden Contacted Us from Hong Kong for Asylum:
Putin, THE HINDU, Sept. 5, 2013.
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most domestic legal systems vis-à-vis international law which makes
defences grounded in international law problematic. These challenges
are, however, manageable and any whistleblower protection can be granted
under strict conditions, such as the impracticality of internal whistleblowing
in the concrete scenario, an appropriate knowledge bar to prevent grossly
inaccurate claims of violations, or even the demand that the information
is released in such a way that it does not harm national security in any
provable manner. Both courts and legislative bodies appear to recognize
the importance of closing this gap in whistleblower protection, especially in
Europe where the value of external whistleblowing for international law
enforcement is finding increasing traction.
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